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I. INTRODUCTION 
How much are you worth?  Employers ask that question before offering 
employment to potential employees.  Investors ask that before deciding to invest 
their assets and savings in the market.  The boards of directors for public 
corporations ask that before approving compensation packages for company 
executives. . . or do they?  Is it not true that the directors of the corporation should 
ask that question and engage in detailed cost benefit analysis to fulfill their duties 
of care and loyalty to the company’s shareholders?  Is it not true that the more 
money an executive receives, the less there is available to distribute in dividends or 
capital gains to the owners of the corporation?   
In a perfect world, every dollar and other form of compensation paid to 
management, whether as simple as an annual contracted salary or complex as 
deferred stock option grants, would go through extensive cost-basis analysis by the 
compensation committee of a board of directors.  It is, after all, the fiduciary duty 
of the board to ensure that management work to achieving the best results for the 
shareholders.  Instead, over the last forty years numerous factors have led to less 
oversight and control over executive compensation.  It now stampedes towards 
infinity.  “The objectives of the firm are to benefit stockholders by attracting 
capital, performing efficiently and profitably, and complying with the law.”1  That 
statement, made by a former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court in an 
Article written after he retired from the bench, seems to lose its meaning when 
examining the excessive amount of compensation that executives of publicly 
traded companies receive.  Managers have utilized the same abilities required to 
maximize the resources and assets of the firm in their approach to maximizing 
their own compensation.2   
With the advent and growth of the Internet, lawmakers and other regulators 
must recognize the potential influence the medium can have on corporate 
communication and policymaking.  Recent changes in many areas of law reflect 
the new awareness, but those in control of regulating the process remain hesitant to 
                                                          
1 E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGugliemlo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law 
and Governance From 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1399, 1411 (2005). 
2 Charles  M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for 
Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271,  273 (1999). 
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open the door to shareholders.3  This paper examines the executive 
overcompensation problem in America, and how new mediums of communication 
and other resources available to Congress, the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and shareholders can ensure that corporations work to serve the interests of 
their true owners.  Part II will begin by examining the executive overcompensation 
problem, from its humble beginnings to where we are now, and provide analysis 
and theories for why the problem occurs. 
Part III will examine the role of the SEC and its obligations to monitor and 
regulate corporations so they will not take advantage of the capital provided to 
them by shareholders.  Furthermore, it will provide a detailed analysis of the proxy 
process, including the new Internet-availability rules. The section will also discuss 
how the SEC failed to take the necessary steps to allow shareholders to benefit 
from the proxy reform, and provide analysis of future implications due to that 
inaction.  Part IV will examine how previous attempts by the SEC and Congress 
have failed to control executive compensation.  Part V will examine how 
shareholders, through the proxy system and the new Internet-availability 
provisions, appear to be the key to controlling executive overcompensation.  This 
section will serve to tie the discussed concepts into a coherent argument for 
increased shareholder power. 
II. EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION 
One of the most recognizable phrases acknowledging the perception of a 
potentially catastrophic problem came from the movie Apollo 13: “Houston, we 
have a problem.”4  The phrase signifies the realization that a situation exists that is 
so out of control and presents such an imminent threat to continuing existence that 
extensive, decisive, and timely action is required to avert dire consequences.  It 
connects with people of all ages, including those born and raised during the era of 
Project Apollo at NASA, and to younger generations that experienced the epic 
event through cinema.  To a lesser degree, and to a more limited audience, the term 
“executive compensation” has begun to develop the same connotation.  When 
hearing the term, those familiar with the circumstances think of grossly excessive 
and unjustified pay packages that have been the subject of congressional hearings, 
scholarly articles, research projects, newspaper discussions, and—most 
importantly— shareholder outrage.  Therefore, as executive compensation 
continues to grow, its effects and connotation might begin to resonate with a wider 
audience. 
There are some—aptly named “marketeers”—that believe any discussion 
regarding limiting compensation through policy reform is unnecessary, instead 
                                                          
3 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
4 During the actual mission, Pilot Jack Swigert stated, “Houston, we’ve had a problem here,” 
followed by a response from the Houston Control Center, and a follow up by Captain James Lovell, Jr., 
“Houston, we’ve had a problem.”  Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/188425.html 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008).  For dramatic purposes, Director Ron Howard shortened to the more 
poignant “Houston, we have a problem.”  See Apollo 13: 2-Disc Anniversary Edition (Disc 1), Special 
Features:Commentary track by Jim and Marilyn Lovell [DVD].   
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believing that the market will dictate and determine the appropriate controls.5  
Although this traditionally conservative market-based view works for establishing 
the value of stocks and bonds in capital markets that are efficient, it has proven to 
be inadequate at controlling executives’ compensation.  Specifically, for stocks of 
publicly traded companies, the market approach works because there are two 
parties with equal bargaining power, a wide range of information, and indexes that 
provide real-time updates on sales of similar type.  Thus, the law of supply and 
demand holds.6  However, regarding executive compensation, a Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) exercises tremendous leverage over the board of directors, 
sometimes sitting on the board himself, in determining his and other executives’ 
compensation packages.7  The idea that the market will dictate the appropriate 
result regarding executive compensation is inadequate because regulators have not 
established the foundation for fair market control.8   
Two recent examples exemplify the problem.  One must only examine the 
pay received by Stanley O’Neal,9 former chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch,10 
and Charles Prince,11 former CEO at Citigroup,12 after they stepped down from 
their respective positions.  Regarding Mr. O’Neal, he resigned from a company 
that lost $8 billion dollars due to losses incurred relating to subprime mortgage 
investments.13  A reasonable person would assume that if his company he managed 
just experienced enormous losses over the past year, that he would not receive 
millions of dollars in compensation.  But that is where reason abandons practice.  
Not admitting he obtained a windfall while his company suffered through horrible 
investment consequences and in arguing that his $161 million pay package was 
appropriate, O’Neal blamed the media for releasing inaccurate reports of his 
compensation, further stating that the board of directors had determined his pay 
after fair negotiations. 14  Never did he offer to disclose the “true” amount he 
                                                          
5 See Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses—Again, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 157–58 (2006). 
6 See generally Nell Minow, Should Shareholders Have a Say on Pay?—Yes, INVESTMENTNEWS, 
May 21, 2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070521/ 
FREE/70518004/1011 (stating that even “passionate” capitalists should recognize the potential 
influence shareholders could have on dictating pay terms for executives).     
7 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
8 This topic will be discussed at length in Part III regarding the SEC’s role in regulating and 
ensuring a fair market.   
9 O’Neal obtained his M.B.A. from Harvard Business School in 1978.  Harvard Business School 
Bulletin, Profile on Stanley O’Neal, http://www.alumni.hbs.edu/bulletin/2001/june/profile.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2008).  He was the first in his family to graduate from college.  Id.  
10 NYSE Ticker: MER.   
11 Prince obtained his B.A., M.B.A., and J.D. from the University of Southern California.  Forbes, 
Charles Prince Profile, http://people.forbes.com/profile/charles-prince/46497 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).  
He serves in a managerial or directorial role for many other companies and charitable organizations, 
including Johnson & Johnson, where he serves on the Compensation & Benefits Committee and the 
Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee.  Id.  He remains a member of the board for 
Citigroup. Id. 
12 NYSE Ticker: C.  
13 David Ellis, Mortgage Mess CEOs Defend Pay, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/2008/ 
03/07/news/newsmakers/ceo_pay/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
14 Id. 
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received after stating the media had reported an incorrect figure.  Regardless, it is 
safe to assume that Mr. O’Neal received millions.   
Citigroup’s CEO Charles Prince stepped down after his company posted a 
fifty-seven percent drop in quarterly earnings, lost nearly a quarter of its market 
value, and gave up a large amount of market share to competitors.  Instead of 
anticipating how it would defend a possible derivative action by shareholders who 
lost thousands of dollars from their portfolios and 401(k) plans, or preparing to 
disseminate news releases regarding how it prepared to make changes in the 
following quarter, Citigroup’s board gave its departing CEO a pat on the back with 
one hand and stuffed a mere $68 million in his pocket for his outstanding efforts.15 
These two situations, and the many like them, are unreasonable and 
unethical, and they should trigger the feelings of inequity and unfairness that all 
people—save executives of public corporations—should develop through their 
lifetimes.  Boards owe more to their shareholders, who happen to be their bosses, 
sources of capital, and reason for existing,16 but, unfortunately, such apathy exists 
on many boards, and circumstances in which a company posted an enormous loss 
but gave excessive pay to their CEOs is commonplace.17  Boards have lost or 
chosen not to exercise their ability to maintain proper oversight.  Now, after 
examining two not-so-unusual incidents regarding excessive executive pay in 
America, and noting how it affects normal shareholders, it seems more appropriate 
to realign the connotation we associated with the term “executive compensation” 
into the same category as “Houston, we have a problem.”  Without decisive action, 
the consequences could be overwhelming. 
A. Brief History 
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the executive overcompensation 
problem did not exist because of the way businesses, the financial markets, and the 
economy were structured.18  As the economy developed, however, and the 
corporate form became prevalent, the times and norms began changing.  As a 
result, the idea of separating control of the entity from ownership became reality.19  
With this separation of control, a new and very ominous agency problem came into 
being.  In turn, this agency problem became a leading reason that executives have 
the ability to influence their compensation.  To regulate the power that managers 
have in the absence of ownership monitoring and control, several procedural and 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 See Carol J. Loomis, This Stuff Is Wrong, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 72. 
17 Including those executives earlier mentioned, the names Eisner and Grasso invoke visions of 
pinnacle examples of excessive executive pay.  There are many others, though; so many that a list 
would continue for pages.   
18 Yablon, supra note 2, at 275. 
19 Id. at 276; see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Translation Publishers 1932).  Berle and Means’ book led the surge in scholarship 
for identifying the new way corporate America would function.  It also served as basis for most 
discussions in Business Organizations classes that discuss the issues presented by the new mode of 
business.  See also discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
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regulatory safeguards came into being, including the SEC.20   
In 1950, a significant change occurred that allowed companies to pay 
executives and other employees with stock options.21  This change to the Internal 
Revenue Code, signed into law by President Truman, is another major reason for 
why we have our current problem.  In the initial years after the change in the law, 
however, specifically from the early 1950s to the middle 1970s, executive pay 
grew at a slower rate than regular employee wages.22  Thus, either companies had 
not learned the best way to use the options, or directors were still able and willing 
to negotiate with executives over reasonable figures.  During that same time, 
especially in the 1960s, the economy saw an increase in conglomerate mergers, 
which led to many companies having nearly unmanageable resources, but in turn, 
more willingness to provide higher compensation to executives.23  The logical flow 
seems to be there: higher responsibilities, higher pay.  However, once pay started 
going up, it never stopped going.  This fact, combined with the stagnate stock 
market which led to companies beginning to take advantage of their ability to pay 
with options, set the foundation for the current pay situation.24  Still, although 
executives received higher salaries than did the rank-and-file workers, the rapid 
jump and continuing rise of compensation levels of which we are now accustomed 
to seeing today was not present during that time.   
Moving along in the century, executive compensation packages were of 
major concern in the late 80s—especially during the hostile takeover era—but 
shareholders took limited action to attempt to control wages.  “As business became 
glamorized in the 1980s, CEOs realized that being famous was more fun than 
being invisible. . . . Instead of being embarrassed by their appearance near the top 
of published CEO pay rankings, many CEOs began to consider it a badge of 
honor.”25  The pay packages represented an accurate portrayal of the culture that 
existed during the decade.  It truly was the “Me! Me! Me! generation of status 
seekers.”26  One of the most enduring and recognizable songs from the decade 
represented the prevailing attitude of American culture: Material Girl by 
Madonna.27  Somehow surviving both the music and self-indulgence attitude of 
that period, and by the time President Ronald Reagan was set to exit the Oval 
Office in 1988, the economy showed signs of recession, which made business 
reporters, shareholders, and Congress examine executive payouts.28  Continued 
scrutiny continued to the early 1990s, where political candidates stumped about 
                                                          
20 See Yablon, supra note 2, at 276; discussion infra Part III.A. 
21 Geoffrey Colvin et al., The Great CEO Pay Heist, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 64. 
22 Id.  
23 Yablon, supra note 2, at 277. 
24 Colvin et al., supra note 21, at 64. 
25 Id. 
26 Kingwood College Library, American Cultural History: 1980–1989, http://kclibrary.lonestar. 
edu/decade80.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).   
27 MADONNA, Material Girl, on LIKE A VIRGIN (Warner Bros. 1984).  The chorus so aptly 
describes the situation: “Living in a material world; And I am a material girl; You know that we are 
living in a material world; And I am a material girl.”  Id.   
28 SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2003: CEOS WIN, WORKERS AND TAXPAYERS 
LOSE 3 (2003), available at http://www.faireconomy.org/files/pdf/Executive_Excess_2003.pdf. 
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passing legislation to control out-of-control executive pay packages.29  However, 
through the middle 1990s and because of the astonishing bull market conditions, 
albeit mainly built on the bubble of the volatile high-technology industry, those 
same shareholders and politicians that voiced concerns in the late 1980s and early 
1990s seemed to lose interest in their attempts to limit executive compensation.30  
Human nature explains the response, or lack of response: as long as shareholders’ 
dividends were high, they cared little about the compensation of those who seemed 
in control and responsible for those gains.31  That represents the ultimate “what 
have you done for me lately” attitude that began to take over in the decade.  “In the 
late 1990s, as the stock market took off, CEOs became modern-day heroes. Few 
really seemed to mind that CEO pay was rising much faster than worker pay, much 
faster even than corporate profits or the stock market.”32  After the recession in 
2002 and continued economic instability that has followed, the attention has once 
again turned to controlling executive compensation.  If we enter a bull economy in 
the near future, it is very likely the problem will continue with no answers in sight.   
Since the late 1980s, executive pay levels have done nothing but 
dramatically increase, even through periods of recession in 2001 and 200233 and 
notwithstanding tax law changes and increased emphasis on more detailed 
disclosure to shareholders.34  Interestingly, the jump in compensation levels came 
partly due to an influx of equity-based packages.35  Although firm size increased, 
“compensation levels increased far beyond what can be attributed to changes in 
size and performance.”36  In 10 years, from 1995 to 2005, average CEO pay 
increased by over 100%, with 60% of the jump having no rational basis.37  In 
2006, the average salary for a CEO of an S&P 500 firm was $15.06 million, 
representing an 11.5% increase over 2005.38  The question becomes what has 
happened since the turn of the 20th Century.  Running a business in a way that 
ownership is separated from control has become the norm for success; why, then, 
have executive compensation packages continued to rise at extraordinary levels?   
                                                          
29 See, e.g., Bill Clinton for President 1992 Campaign Brochures, available at 
http://www.4president.org/brochures/billclinton1992brochure.htm (“Eliminate deductions for 
companies that . . . reward outrageous executive pay.”); see also Martin, supra note 5, at 148 
(“Executive compensation became an issue for the candidates in the 1992 presidential campaign.”).   
30 See Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to 
Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 972 (2004); see also SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 3.  
31 McClendon, supra note 30, at 972. 
32 SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 3. 
33 See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF 
ECO. POL’Y 283, 285, 289 (2005). 
34 See discussion infra Parts IV.A–B. 
35 Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 33, at 291.  As this paper will discuss later, it appears that this 
jump in equity-based compensation resulted directly from efforts by Congress to control executives’ 
pay through the Internal Revenue Code.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
36 Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 33, at 286.   
37 Id. at 287.   
38 AFL-CIO, 2006 TRENDS IN CEO PAY (2007), http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/ 
pay/index.cfm?RenderForPrint=1 (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (citing numbers from THE CORPORATE 
LIBRARY'S ANNUAL CEO PAY SURVEY 2007 (Corporate Library 2007)). 
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B. The Failure of the Corporate Board 
It is impossible to identify one source or dispositive factor that has led to the 
undesired developments in corporate America.  According to Warren Buffet, 
executive pay is the acid test for determining whether the American financial 
markets can monitor and reform themselves.39  If this indeed is true, our markets 
are inflated, misleading, and working adverse to those who participate in them.  It 
also indicates that, although no one factor is dispositive, the continued failure of 
the corporate board to work in shareholders’ interests is the leading factor to 
executive overcompensation.  Due to of the nature of ownership of public 
companies in America,40 corporate boards, due to the legal principles preventing 
active shareholder intervention, have significant power.41  These boards, however, 
still are unable or unwilling to negotiate at arm’s length with executives regarding 
pay packages.42   
1. Agency Issues 
Many argue that executive overcompensation is a result of an agency 
problem, which is a perfectly logical conclusion.  Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means first addressed this issue, specifically targeting problems inherent with 
separating ownership from control, in the 1930s,43 but the principles and ideas they 
developed remain practical today.  Succinctly, the “[n]on-owner managers may be 
tempted to maximize their own welfare rather than the profits of the firm that 
employs them, preferring themselves over the shareholders who own the firm.”44  
It is impossible to avoid this situation, primarily due to the large amount of 
business conducted and obligations involved in day-to-day business.  The old-
fashioned-individually-owned establishments that existed during the 1800s and 
early 1900s could no longer compete with businesses that moved to the corporate 
form and ownership through dispersed shareholders.  Although shown that the 
corporate form provides a way to conduct efficient business transactions, which in 
turn creates economic advantages,45 some negative consequences exist.  
With this type of business, the managers who run operations from day-to-day 
should act as agents for the firm, but they have other incentives to maximize their 
own interests.46  Additionally, the problem of shirking causes those in charge to do 
                                                          
39 Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 2004). 
40 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
41 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholers Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006).   
42 AM. FED’N OF STATE, COUNTY & MUN. EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO & THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, 
ENABLERS OF EXCESS: MUTUAL FUNDS & THE OVERPAID AMERICAN CEO 3 (2006), 
http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/capital/upload/enablersofexcess.pdf. 
43 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 19. 
44 Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and 
Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 
1198–99 (1999). 
45 Id. at 1197.  Many factors exist for why the corporate form is better suited for large business, 
namely limited liability for the owners and perpetual life if all continues to go well. 
46 Id. at 1199. 
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as little as possible and still get the job done.47  Both in turn affect how different 
groups, in this case management and shareholders, perceive different projects, with 
the former preferring to maximize short-term wealth to ensure their continued 
employment, and the latter preferring to maximize long-term stability to ensure a 
reasonable return on their investment.  Shareholders desire management to engage 
in activities that increase overall firm profitability, but these actions may not result 
in the immediate profits for which are required in management-driven 
compensation plans.  Thus, management has an incentive to do as little as possible 
while still maintaining short-term profitability of the firm.48  Scholars have long 
argued whether security regulations, legal doctrines, or private agreements can best 
reduce the divergence in interests between the managers and shareholders, and the 
debate continues with no single theory better than the next.49  What is certain is 
that the agency problem is significant.  It affects how managers determine the 
extent of their efforts to produce profits for the corporation, which business 
opportunities to engage the firm in, and, most importantly for this paper, how 
managers bargain—or dictate terms—with corporate boards regarding 
compensation.50 
State corporate law statutes design corporate boards to prevent the exact 
types of actions listed above by giving them control over ratifying and monitoring 
company executives and other fundamental transactions.51  Accordingly, by law, 
boards must make decisions to ensure corporate efficiency and ensure corporate 
assets are used to benefit shareholders.52  However, boards often do not have the 
ability to engage in effective monitoring that would benefit the shareholders.  Most 
members have other jobs that require their full attention, and corporate business 
falls on the scale of priorities; further, some members serve on multiple boards in 
addition to full time jobs.53  Because of that, increasing passivity prevails on 
boards at every publicly traded company in America.54  “Management, no longer 
checked, freely engages in conduct that is slothful, ill-directed, or self-dealing—all 
to the corporation’s detriment.”55 
                                                          
47 Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 877, 887 (2007). 
48 See Martin, supra note 5, at 153–54 (quoting Adam Smith, who, in 1776, recognized the 
problems created by the divergent interests of two parties in business). 
49 See, e.g., id. (discussing the contractual theory); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976) (discussing the need for legal intervention); BERLE & 
MEANS, supra note 19, at 233–40 (discussing needed regulations to control corporate managers).  These 
three works span across sixty-seven years of economic and corporate theory, yet we still encounter 
problems that pre-existed each work.    
50 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 16 (2004). 
51 Butler & McChesney, supra note 44, at 1201. 
52 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—The History 
of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 128 (1996).  
53 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 17. 
54 Elson, supra note 52, at 128. 
55 Id. 
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2. Managerial Power Theory 
A leading theory for explaining why corporate boards fail to control 
executives is the product of Professors Lucian Bebchuk 56 and Jesse Fried;57 it 
emphasizes the concept that management exercises unchecked power in 
negotiations with the board, and directors’ interest lies with the CEO and not to the 
corporation.58  Included in this theory is the recognition that directors, realizing 
their fate relates directly to the personal relationship they have with the CEO, seek 
to please management to ensure sustainability of their position.59  Managers use 
their power to overcome the proper arm’s length bargaining over compensation, 
which requires directors to disguise excessive compensation amounts from 
shareholders by camouflaging the payments as stock options and other deferred 
compensation.60  The point of hiding the excessive payments is to limit the 
“outrage” (as Bebchuk and Fried call it) by shareholders when they realize what 
the executives have received.61  The theory holds that the only true restraint on 
executive compensation is shareholder outrage.   
The theory suggests that executive overcompensation occurs because passive 
                                                          
56 From his biography on the Harvard Law School website:  
Professor Bebchuk is the William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman 
Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on 
Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School.  Bebchuk is a Research Associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research and Inaugural Fellow of the 
European Corporate Governance Network. 
Trained in both law and economics, Bebchuk holds an LL.M. and S.J.D. from 
Harvard Law School and an M.A. and Ph.D in Economics from the Harvard 
Economics Department.  He joined the Harvard Law School faculty in 1986 as an 
assistant professor, becoming a full professor in 1988, and the Friedman 
Professor of Law, Economics and Finance in 1998. 
Bebchuk's research focuses on corporate governance, law and finance, and law 
and economics, and he has published more than seventy research articles in 
academic journals in law, economics, and finance.  
Harvard Law School’s Faculty Biographies, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/bio.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2008).  
57 From his biography at the University of California School of Law:  
Jesse M. Fried is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and Faculty Co-Director of the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the 
Economy (BCLBE).  He holds an A.B. and A.M in Economics from Harvard 
University, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.  Fried joined the Berkeley 
faculty in 1997 following two years in practice and a two-year Olin Fellowship at 
Harvard Law School. 
Fried's main areas of research are executive compensation, corporate governance, 
corporate bankruptcy and venture capital.  
UC Berkeley School of Law, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/friedj/homepage.htm (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2008). 
58 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 61–79; see also Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics 
Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025,  2028 (2007) (outlining and describing 
the managerial power theory); Polsky, supra note 47, at 890–91 (explaining how the arm’s length 
model and Managerial Power Model are products of the agency problem). 
59 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 80–86. 
60 Id. at 61, 67. 
61 Id. at 64. 
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boards agree to salary packages without the semblance of objective discussion,62 
and then try to cover for their laziness by camouflaging payments.63  The directors, 
even those on the compensation committees, are self-admittedly “‘in the pocket of 
the CEOs’” and never engage in arm’s length bargaining.64  Undoubtedly, this 
invites CEOs to dictate terms to the board.  Further complicating the problem, 
CEOs usually sit on the boards for which they are supposedly “bargaining” with 
over compensation.65  Nothing could represent a higher level of conflicting 
interests, especially given the amount of money and other capital assets public 
corporations have at their disposal.66   
Another way in which managerial power influences pay is that the law, by 
allowing for various anti-takeover measures and other obstacles, insulates 
managers from potential removal.67  With no plausible threat of removal due to 
poor performance by directors, outsiders, or even shareholders, management has 
no other reasons or influences to make them take lower pay.68  Thus, anyone that 
would potentially challenge an excessive pay package can do nothing but wait for 
the executive to leave.69  Assuming one had the ability to challenge, “[S]ince at 
least the 1960s courts have been far more deferential to the board’s decision to 
enter such [compensation] contracts” even if evidence exists of hardly objective 
bargaining.70  It is a circular analysis, with the conclusions ending the same every 
time: executives take home millions, directors maintain the status quo, and 
shareholders receive less for their investment.  Additionally, the legal ramifications 
surrounding board passivity are either insignificant or non-existent.  Provided 
companies disclose all compensation in their public filings,71 and the board of 
                                                          
62 Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay 
Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 128 (2002) 
(“executive ‘overcompensation is basically the fault of passive boards that agree to salary packages on 
demand, without spirited negotiations’”). 
63 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 68.  The camouflaging of benefits can come through 
granting equity instruments or it can come in the form of lucrative retirement packages.  Id. at 95–111.  
Furthermore, the hidden benefits can come in the form of loans to executives, even though provisions in 
Sarbanes-Oxley bar their use.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2008).  Existing loans at the time of the prohibition, 
however, are exempted from this ban.  BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 112.   
64 Stabile, supra note 62, at 128. 
65 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 38–41. 
66 Not only do executives exercise a great amount of control during their negotiations, some have a 
great amount of control over who will be their successor.  See, e.g., Kip Walton, Disney Sues Disney: 
Shareholders After Another Election, DAILY FIN. NEWS, May 10, 2005, http://www.dailyfinancenews. 
com/Disney-Sues-Disney_s757.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) (discussing how ousted CEO Michael 
Eisner handpicked his successor, whom the board voted for with no questions asked).  Therefore, 
shareholders can go through the painstaking effort and costs associated with a proxy contest only to 
have the management or board member they somehow remove pick his successor.   
67 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 83–85 (referring to Poison Pills). 
68 See id. at 45–46.  Why would anyone take lower pay when what they make is legal and for what 
was “negotiated?”  If we were to accept the notion of proper negotiation, this paper would be as useless 
as a politician’s promises.   
69 See generally id. at 45–52 (describing the limited power shareholders have to intervene in the 
corporate affairs of a publicly traded business). 
70 Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers 
Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 501 (2007). 
71 See discussion infra part IV.A.  
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directors does not engage in gross misconduct that would give rise to liability,72 
executives and directors are truly free to do whatever they please. 
Though the managerial power theory seems to address why executives are 
able to obtain such high pay packages, some believe that the only problem is the 
inability of directors and compensation committees to negotiate in the best 
interests of the corporation.73  Although this theory ignores the reality that these 
same directors have well-developed negotiating and analytical skills, especially 
when it comes to allocating resources, large contracts, and general business 
techniques, the end results are still the same as with the Managerial Power Theory: 
the executives have all the control and power in the board room.74  “To break 
management’s grip on the board and stimulate real oversight, an appeal must be 
made to the director’s same sense of personal self-interest,”75 pride, or security, all 
of which management currently controls.  Until there is a major change, in either 
the law or the governance structure of corporations, the problems will continue to 
exist.   
3. Group Dynamics Theory 
In recent years, the executive compensation problem has received attention 
from psychologists to determine what exactly causes the lack of bargaining.  This 
is much more theoretical than the Managerial Power Theory because it bases not 
on specific tendencies of management or boards, but on examining general human 
tendencies.  The Group Dynamics Theory opines that executive overcompensation 
occurs as result of a flaw within a group’s psychological behavior.76  Because the 
group—board of directors—desires to act as a cohesive unit, any decisions, 
whether major or minor, become products of “groupthink;” however, management 
does not exercise the degree of control as suggested with the Managerial Power 
Theory, but simply manipulates the group in one way or another.77  Groupthink is 
a phenomenon that can best be quantified by examining a group of people with 
similar interests all wanting to make a process run smoothly, so each member 
agrees on uniform terms, even though some member had some objections to the 
result.  This process is used to ensure and facilitate unanimous “clubby” 
decisions.78  Another interpretation, more simply stated, is that this phenomenon is 
the “good old boy” theory.  The executive neither dominates nor dictates terms to 
                                                          
72 Jones, supra note 70, at 477; see infra note 240 and accompanying text.  Examples from 
Delaware Law are used because most companies referred to herein are incorporated in Delaware.   
73 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen , Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We’ve 
Been, How We Got Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 53 (Harvard Fin., Working 
Paper No. 44-2004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305 
(“poor negotiating expertise on the part of remuneration committees may explain more of the increase 
than captive board members catering to entrenched managers”). 
74 See id. at 54; BEBCHUK & FRIED,  supra note 50, at 24–30. 
75 Elson, supra note 52, at 133.  
76 Dorff, supra note 58, at 2029. 
77 Id. at 2030. 
78 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 
247 (2d. ed. 1982). 
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the board, but simply becomes such a part of the group that all decisions receive 
glossy analysis.79  The foundation is there, and “[g]roupthink seems likely to 
develop on many corporate boards,”80 mainly due to the members homogeneous 
composition.81   
In this situation, it is not that the executives force directors into making poor 
decisions, but that the pressure to act as a uniform group makes the board decide as 
it does.  Thus, the Group Dynamics Theory does share some attributes with the 
Managerial Power Theory, most notably that the results are the same: executives 
receive excessive payments without the arm’s length bargaining process.  
Furthermore, this theory recognizes that directors, provide they, in the first place, 
would engage in objective bargaining, “have little incentive to spend time working 
through the details of a complex compensation package, much less to dream up 
alternatives to the traditional forms of compensation.”82  This is due to the 
overarching intent of following the group.  Not one director wants to cause unrest 
by going against the unanimity.83  Thus, the status quo remains as such and the 
lemmings march on.   
4. Other Possible Explanations and Justifications 
There are several practical explanations why executives receive lucrative pay 
packages without the benefit of objective analysis, but they all share some 
similarities with ideas established in the Managerial Power and Group Dynamics 
Theories.  One must only examine the structure and nature of a publicly traded 
corporation to obtain an idea of why the problem exists.  Because of the wide 
dispersion of shareholders, a power vacuum exists within a corporation, and 
regardless of whether company executives seek control of the board, because of 
this vacuum, the default system is one where the CEO dominates the board.84  This 
domination is not because the executive intends to dominate the board, or because 
the group believes it to be the simplest and easiest way to run the company, but it 
happens as part of the natural human behavior.  Again, there are aspects of the 
governance system that tend to favor this outcome.  Mainly, executives maintain 
domination and control over the proxy process thereby handcuffing the 
shareholders from the ability to exercise any governing power.85  Even recognizing 
this as a leading factor turns one to recognize that there is a failure on the part of 
                                                          
79 Dorff, supra note 58, at 2036. 
80 Id. at 2038. 
81 Id. at 2038–39 n.72 (citing KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
STUDY 10 (2003)).  “Public company boards overwhelmingly consist of white, middle-aged men from 
privileged backgrounds who have spent their careers working for large corporations.”  Id. 
82 Id. at 2045. 
83 Id.  
84 See Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1869, 1891 (2001). 
85 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Toward a True Corporate 
Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1775 (2006) (noting that proxy contests are so expensive, yet the board and 
incumbent management have unlimited access to the company’s coffers).   
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the SEC.  Of course, extending the blame further for the sake of finding some 
reason to point to would extend into criticizing and seeking reform of the laissez 
faire approach in the American market economy.  This, however, would be 
complete overkill.  
Proponents of another theory, the Optimal Contracting Theory, opine that 
because public corporations generate mass sums of money and resources, 
payments to executives indicate an efficient use of the ability to contract with those 
that will produce a return on assets.86  Thus, provided the corporation is doing 
well, any pay structure negotiated, used in the loosest sense of the word, with the 
executives are efficient and appropriate.  This theory also goes to argue that the 
skills, knowledge, and abilities of top-performing CEOs makes them a scarce 
resource, in fact, such a scarce resource that companies, acting through their 
boards, should be willing to pay what the market dictates to retain their valuable 
commodities.87  Those that argue executive compensation is not a problem, 
provided it is the result of a negotiated contract in the best interests of the 
corporation, prefer this approach.  Again, though, we must go back and look at the 
true essence of the agreements to determine if there is fair negotiation.  If it really 
is an optimal contract, why do the executives still make millions when the 
companies struggle?   
Still yet, another justification comes from the responsibilities and risks of the 
executive position itself.  Recently ousted from his position as CEO at Vivendi 
Universal and shamed by accusations that he engaged in fraud, Jean-Marie Messier 
stated before agreeing to serve in that position, “The possibility of being fired by 
one’s shareholders, whether as a result of a takeover or for any other reason, is one 
of the risks of being a chief executive.  We are paid for that.  And well paid.”88  He 
went on to describe that he would never ask for excessive payments when he left 
his position, but two years later, his attitude changed, and he asked for millions in a 
severance agreement.89  It is true that executives should receive some type of risk 
premium because their jobs are not as secure,90 but this argument falters for two 
reasons.  First, executives have just as much job security as any other ordinary 
employee, and second, studies suggest that job security is not as important of a 
factor to employees, including executives.91  Why should executives receive a 
premium for an issue they do not consider important in deciding where to work?  
However, that has become a given in the current pay structures and likely not to 
change.   
                                                          
86 Dorff, supra note 58, at 2029. 
87 Id. 
88 Jo Johnson, Vivendi Universal’s Former Chief Executive Denies Any Stain on His Reputation, 
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at 13. 
89 Id. 
90 Stabile, supra note 62, at 125. 
91 Id. at 126-27. 
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C. Lasting Effects 
1. Rank-and-File Inferiority Complex 
As executive pay continues to rise, there is an undeniable realization that the 
rank-and-file employees will begin to feel inferior in their place in the companies.  
Stated otherwise, the people who actively engaged the public to facilitate the 
revenue for the company they work for are being left far behind in terms of pay, 
resulting in feelings that the company does not appreciate their efforts and takes 
advantage of their abilities.  We must only look at the differences in pay between 
the rank-and-file employees and executives.  The CEO-worker pay gap in 2002 
was 282–1, 7 times larger than the ratio of 42–1 in 1982.92  Even more drastically, 
the CEO-worker pay ratio in 2000 was an astounding 531–1.93  Though that ratio 
decreased in years where the American economy struggled thereby indicating 
some type of reality check on the executives, the differences are still staggering.  
For a more realistic and quantifiable analysis, compare the growth numbers in 
executive pay to that of the salaries of ordinary employees, specifically focusing 
on the minimum wage for ease.  “If the federal minimum wage, which stood at 
$3.80 an hour in 1990, had grown at the same rate as CEO pay, it would have been 
$14.40 in 2002 instead of $5.15.”94  That figure is astonishing, especially given 
that it represents a number that is six years old.   
Not only are executives making money at an exponentially greater level than 
the rank-and-file employees are, but they have proven that, when circumstances 
show impending financial disaster, the executives are more than happy to allow the 
rank-and-file employees to bear the burden and heartache of experiencing the fall 
of the company.  Specifically, during the Enron crisis, company executives were 
liquidating their portfolios while the rank-and-file employees were doing all they 
could to fill up their 401(k) assets with the same Enron stock insiders knew was 
worth less than the paper in the recycling bins.95 
The immediate question is whether executives are truly a valuable 
commodity that corporations should be paying hundreds of millions of dollars.  
One could argue that many regular employees could do just as well as executives, 
yet because they do not have the required Ivy League educations, no corporation 
will give them a legitimate opportunity.  This argument is exemplified by evidence 
that shows executives in Japan and Germany are not separated by the enormous 
                                                          
92 See id. at 115–18; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 21.  
93 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 21. 
94 Id.  At that hypothetical level, and assuming a minimum wage earner works forty hours a week, 
with no overtime, and gets two weeks off in a year, the worker’s yearly gross income would be 
$28,800.  Adjusted to today’s dollars, the minimum wage would be $17.23, and the gross income would 
be $34, 467.63, both based on the average increase in the Consumer Price Index.  Enter calculations at 
MeasuringWorth.com, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).  Both 
figures are significantly higher than their true value today.  The current minimum wage in Texas is 
$6.55.  U. S. Dept. of Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the United States, http://www.dol.gov/esa/ 
minwage/america.htm#Texas (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).  With the same assumptions as above, the 
yearly gross income is $14,000.   
95 Stabile, supra note 62, at 117; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 21.  
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pay gap that exists in the United States.96  Others argue that the executives are 
worth every penny they are paid, mainly because there are only a select few that 
can handle the responsibilities.97  What is seemingly uniform is that rank-and-file 
employees feel inferior, both in esteem and in worth.  A poll conducted in 2002 
concluded that eighty-seven percent of respondents believed that top company 
executives are paid more than they deserve, and, significantly, the managers earn 
more at the expense of ordinary workers.98  Furthermore, empirical evidence 
indicates that when a CEO cuts employees from his company’s workforce, his 
compensation increases significantly the next year.99  This indicates that boards 
reward those executives that cut the workforce, thereby giving executives the 
incentive to make job cuts, even if they are not justified.  This also indicates that 
management seems to treat ordinary employees as bargaining devices with boards 
in that if the executives promise cuts to decrease the outflow of company 
resources, they will be compensated accordingly, even if the firm does not perform 
better.  Ordinary workers will likely begin to feel inferior, thus leading to a 
decrease in production.100  Further, this inferiority could lead to a decrease in 
worker motivation and disrupt effective teamwork.101  If this occurs, the stability 
of the American economy could be in jeopardy.   
2. International Comparisons  
To broaden the context of the executive compensation problem, it is 
important to examine how the United States’ approach compares to that of the rest 
of the world.  This could influence whether the American market maintains its 
dominance in the ever-globalizing world economy.  Just as with rank-and-file 
employees, executives in America receive significantly higher compensation than 
their counterparts in Japan, Britain, and Germany.102  This is hardly surprising.  
Though most of this comes from the preferential use of stock options in the United 
States,103 it also might have a lot to do with the fact that “shareholder rights in the 
U.S. are weaker than they are” elsewhere in the world.104  In particular, the 
                                                          
96 Stabile, supra note 62, at 121 & n.22; see discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
97 See, e.g., JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISES IN AMERICAN PAY 6 (1998); 
IRA T. KAY, CEO PAY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: HELPING THE U.S. WIN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
WAR 19 (1998); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000).  The same factors that lead to the increase in CEO pay do not apply to rank-and-
file employees.  Stabile, supra note 62, at 122. 
98 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 3. 
99 Id. at 5–7; see Table 1.1: CEO Pay at the 50 Companies with the Most Layoffs Announced in 
2001. Id. at 6. 
100 See Stabile, supra note 62, at 143-48. 
101 Id. at 147. 
102 See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 866 (2002);  see also Martin, supra note 5, at 
158–60 (explaining how the SEC should take, as an example of effective executive pay disclosures, the 
British reform aimed at involving shareholders in determining compensation packages). 
103 Murphy, supra note 102, at 866. 
104 Hearing on Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation Before the United States 
House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, 110 Cong. 9 (2007) (written testimony of 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk) (hereinafter Bebchuk Testimony), available at http://financialservices. 
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differences in shareholder rights in the United States and the United Kingdom are 
very distinct.  First, shareholders in the United Kingdom have the ability to remove 
and nominate directors to the board.105  This fact makes it easier for British 
shareholders to make directors more accountable.  In doing so, the directors take 
more initiative to ensure that executives’ compensation is more reasonable, 
especially when compared to that in the United States.106  Second, shareholders in 
the United Kingdom have the ability to call special meetings and amend corporate 
charters through resolutions to address issues that cannot wait until the annual 
meetings.107  Not only do the shareholders have more power to remove directors 
they believe are not acting in their best interests, new British reforms have made 
the normally passive investor a more active player in corporate governance.108  
Finally, boards in the United States have the ability to engage in more decisive and 
aggressive defensive tactics in response to potential takeovers.109 
Given the fact that executives in the United Kingdom earn less money than 
executives in the United States, but, “[b]etween 2000 and 2005, the [Financial 
Times Stock Exchange] FTSE 100’s average annual return was 6.5% while the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average was 2% during the same period,”110 it would seem 
that some explanation is required.  The approach taken by the United Kingdom 
represents the corporate law system in place around the world; only the United 
States has so many impediments restricting shareholder power.111  
The best counterargument is that most businesses prefer the American 
system because it allows the board and management to have more autonomy.  
Traditionally, companies favored the regulatory controls imposed by the 
government and SEC, which normally gave companies wide latitude and 
freedoms,112 provided the companies followed all disclosure rules.  This changed 
somewhat in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley,113 which established requirements 
for more oversight and accountability by directors and executives.114  It is true that 
                                                          
house.gov/hearing110/htbebchuk030807.pdf. 
105 Id. 
106 See Martin, supra note 5, at 158–59. 
107 Bebchuk Testimony, supra note 104, at 5. 
108 Martin, supra note 5, at 158.  The enhanced disclosures include reports on “the current value of 
executive pension plans and severance agreements.”  Id.  The reports must also indicate whether an 
executives compensation package was negotiated by a member of the compensation committee or 
consultant.  Id. at 159. 
109 Bebchuk Testimony, supra note 104, at 5. 
110 Martin, supra note 5, at 158-9. 
111 Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 848 
(2005). 
112 See generally Murphy, supra note 102, at 866–67.  Professor Murphy discusses the unique 
approach taken in the United States regarding the accounting methods for options, and explains that this 
has caused the increasing use of the options because of the tax benefits.  Id. at 867.  “These tax and 
accounting differences can help explain why U.S. boards are more generous with their option grants 
than are boards in other countries.”  Id. 
113  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at various sections in 
Title 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
114 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C §1514A (Supp. IV 2004).  An in-depth 
discussion on the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation is well beyond the scope of this paper.  What 
is important for this section is to note that the increasing regulations are forcing issuers to list in other 
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most of the largest businesses in the world are incorporated in the United States, 
however a trend has emerged:  
[S]ince the new regulatory mechanisms have been put in place, developments in the 
U.S. capital market have not been positive.  In 2000, 90% of the funds raised by 
foreign companies through new stock offerings were raised in the U.S.  The “90% 
rule” held in 2005, too, but in reverse—90% of the funds raised by foreign firms 
through new listings occurred in Europe and other non-U.S. markets.  Last year, 
only two of the world’s 25 largest initial public offerings listed in the U.S. since 
Congress enacted the tighter restrictions.115  
If this trend continues, and if American companies continue with the pattern 
of grossly excessive pay packages at the same time as restricting shareholder 
rights, the United States might indeed lose its place as the dominant financial 
power in the world.   
III. A NEW ERA OF SHAREHOLDER POWER? 
A. The Role of the SEC 
After the breakdown of the financial markets in 1929, the American 
confidence in the domestic and global financial markets disappeared.116  The 
country entered the Great Depression and, thereafter, Congress announced that 
they would have hearings to determine possible actions to combat the crises.117  
With the information obtained at the hearings, Congress established the SEC to 
enforce the new securities laws and promulgate financial regulations in accordance 
therewith.118  One of these laws, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act), 
provided the SEC with the authority required to establish rules regarding many 
aspects of post-IPO trading.119  Section 14 of the ‘34 Act provides the legal 
                                                          
countries.  This fact provides support to the argument that companies would not abandon their United 
States listings if required to restrict executive pay or provide shareholders more access rights in 
governance. 
115 R. Glenn Hubbard & John L. Thornton, Is the U.S. Losing Ground?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 
2006, at A12; see also MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S 
AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 17 (2007) (describing that the imposing 
obligations of Sarbanes-Oxley are negatively impacting new businesses in the United States); HENRY 
N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW 
TO FIX IT (AEI Press 2006). 
116 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
The information listed states that, “[d]uring the 1920s, approximately 20 million large and small 
shareholders took advantage of post-war prosperity and set out to make their fortunes in the stock 
market.  It is estimated that of the $50 billion in new securities offered during this period, half became 
worthless.”  Id.  It is hard to fathom that type of breakdown in the twenty-first century; only because of 
efficient regulation and defensive procedures did our country avoid a complete market crash following 
the September 11 attacks.  
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
119 Id. 
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provisions that govern the solicitation and requirements of proxies;120 Regulation 
14A contains the rules promulgated by the SEC to carry out the purpose of the 
securities laws.121  As Congress intended, the broad and expansive duties of 
regulating the largest economy in the world fell squarely on the shoulders of the 
SEC following the depression.  It seems important, then, that the SEC use all of its 
abilities within its delegated power to make the American capital markets efficient, 
transparent, and fair.  As such, the SEC should empower the shareholders of large 
public corporations with the ability to engage the governance process in a manner 
uncommon in today’s corporate environment.   
B. An Overview of the Proxy Process 
A proxy allows a shareholder to allow another person to vote on his or her 
behalf at the annual meeting of a corporation.122  Due to the nature and 
characteristics of proxy material, the law imposes a strict standard of compliance 
in an effort to ensure that shareholders exercise their voting rights.123  With that in 
mind, the SEC set out the basic form and requirements that a proxy issued by a 
company or shareholder must follow in Rule 14a-4.124  In this rule, the proxy shall 
indicate who is soliciting the proxy and how this solicitor will act on the proposals 
contained in the statement.125  Under the current scheme, if the proxy relates to the 
election of directors, it must allow the shareholder an opportunity to either vote for 
or withhold a vote for the nominee.126  In addition to establishing minimum 
                                                          
120 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78n (West 2009)). 
121 The SEC promulgated various rules, beginning at section 14a-1, to govern proxy solicitations.  
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to a-15 (2007); see also EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF 
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, § 15.4 (2007) (providing a 
summary of proxy laws established by Congress and rules promulgated by the SEC).  
122 Rose A. Zukin, We Talk, You Listen: Should Shareholders’ Voices Be Heard or Stifled When 
Nominating Directors? How the Proposed Shareholder Director Nomination Rule Will Contribute to 
Restoring Proper Corporate Governance, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 937, 955 (2006) (citing Teresa Carnell & 
James J. Hanks, Jr., Shareholder Voting and Proxy Solicitation: The Fundamentals, 37 MD. B.J. 23, 24 
(2004)).  
123 See id. at 956. 
124 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4. 
125 Id. § 240.14a-4(a)(1),(3).  
126 Id. § 240.14a-4(b)(2).  Specifically, this entire section states the following:  
A form of proxy which provides for the election of directors shall set forth the 
names of persons nominated for election as directors.  Such form of proxy shall 
clearly provide any of the following means for security holders to withhold 
authority to vote for each nominee: 
i. A box opposite the name of each nominee which may be marked to 
indicate that authority to vote for such nominee is withheld; or 
ii. An instruction in bold-face type which indicates that the security holder 
may withhold authority to vote for any nominee by lining through or 
otherwise striking out the name of any nominee; or 
iii. Designated blank spaces in which the security holder may enter the 
names of nominees with respect to whom the security holder chooses to 
withhold authority to vote; or 
                          iv. Any other similar means, provided that clear instructions are furnished indicating   
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requirements for proxy forms, the regulations describe the matters that a proxy 
vote cannot confer.127  Specifically, anyone attempting to solicit a proxy must 
follow the established guidelines.128  Rule 14a-5 supplements the requirements of 
Rule 14a-4, describing how an issuer shall present the proxy information.129  
Another important rule is Rule 14a-3, which provides that a proxy statement that 
follows the above guidelines must accompany the solicitation of a shareholder’s 
proxy.130  These compliance standards enable the SEC to achieve the goal of 
maximum disclosure that leads to a better-informed investor.   
The proxy system, due to the extensive and specific requirements, provides a 
double-edged sword.  For any shareholder that wants to make a proposal to enter 
on the corporation’s proxy statement, the costs can be insurmountable.131  
Incumbent boards always have a significant advantage over shareholders, even the 
large block shareholders with vast assets, because shareholders cannot vote against 
board-sponsored candidates or propose different board candidates.132  Furthermore, 
and very importantly, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), the “town meeting rule,” directors 
may exclude proposals by shareholders that relate to the election of a member to 
the board of directors.133  Therefore, not only must a shareholder deal with 
extensive barriers to having his or her proposal appear on the company statement, 
                                                          
                          how the security holder may withhold authority to vote for any nominee. 
Id.  
127 Id. § 240.14a-4(d).  
128 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(f).  
129 The SEC states that the information “shall be clearly presented” and “divided into groups 
according to subject matter” with headings that identify each subject.  Id. § 240.14a-5(a).  The 
information must be in a standard “roman type at least as large and as legible as 10-point modern type.”  
Id. § 240.14a-5(d)(1).  The proxy must contain information regarding when shareholder proposals are 
due and whether the date of the shareholder meeting changes.  Id. § 240.14a-5(e)(1), (f).   
130 17 C.F.R.  § 240.14a-3.  
131 See id. § 240.14a-8.  Under the Rules, the SEC says the following concerning shareholder 
proposals making the corporate proxy statement:  
[I]n order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, 
and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you 
must be eligible and follow certain procedures.  
. . . .  
(1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held 
at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be 
voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit 
the proposal.  You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the 
meeting.   
Id.  If the shareholder does not meet the eligibility or procedural requirements, the “company 
may exclude [the shareholder’s] proposal.”  Id. 
Id.  From attempting to follow that described process, it is obvious that the costs associated with the 
requirements make it practically impossible for shareholders to engage in effective corporate 
governance.  
132 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 407, 418 
(2006).  
133 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). Shareholders can only submit a proposal if they meet certain 
requirements.  Normally, corporations are required to include the proposal in its proxy report; however, 
if the company can identify that the proposal falls under one of the exceptions delineated in 14a-8, it 
may exclude.  See id. §§ 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(13).  The problems presented by this barrier will be discussed 
at length later in the paper.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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the Rules give companies thirteen possible ways to exclude a proposal.134  
The SEC does provide limited exceptions for shareholders seeking 
information but not a proxy solicitation.  However, these exceptions are limited to 
shareholder discussion about how he or she will vote and why,135 when a 
shareholder attempts communication without requesting a proxy,136 and putting 
definitions on what type of material counts as a “solicitation.”137  In other words, if 
a shareholder engages in ministerial functions and activities that will have no effect 
on meaningful corporate governance, the shareholder will not have to bear the 
expense of the proxy process.  Though one could argue that those exceptions 
extend to roles beyond that, the response to that argument is decisive: These 
exceptions do not extend to every shareholder.   
In the cases where a controlling shareholder or a corporate activist who 
desires to become a controlling shareholder—one who truly wants to affect 
governance—attempts to solicit proxies, the Rules are not so lenient.  Normally, a 
shareholder “testing the waters,” or expressing desires to stay passive, with a 
memorandum containing his thoughts will have to file an accompanying proxy 
statement.138  Additionally, any shareholder who owns the market value equivalent 
of $5,000,000 must file a brief notice with the SEC that can ruin any type of 
“stealth approach” for taking over management.139  This has the effect of tipping 
off management to potential governance problems, thereby allowing for 
preemptive strikes or other actions to avoid proxy fights.  With one hand, the SEC 
gives shareholders more reasonable means to affect corporate governance, but with 
the other hand, the SEC clamps down on those shareholders most capable.  The 
result is maintaining the status quo.   
The SEC does allow shareholders seeking to send out proxies to call upon 
the “disclose or mail” rule, which provides that, upon a written request by a 
shareholder, a company must disclose the names of its shareholders so that one 
soliciting proxies will know where to send the information.140  This will decrease 
the upfront costs of a challenging shareholder in getting the information for 
potential proxy recipients, but, when compared to the overall barriers, it does 
nothing more than further the “feel-good” regulation scheme in place regarding 
corporate governance.  The regulations established by the SEC are well intended, 
and, if used properly, can be very effective, but they can be too cumbersome and 
difficult to quantify in lay terms.  
If management or a shareholder targets a desired change in board positions, 
or if a current board member is stepping down and a proxy statement lists potential 
candidates for replacements, the Rules allow for listing and describing candidates 
whom shareholders should not pledge their vote.141  Thus, provided a legitimate 
                                                          
134 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(13).  
135 Id. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv). 
136 Id. § 240.14a-1(b)(1). 
137 See id. § 240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii). 
138 See id. § 240.14a-3. 
139 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g).  
140 See id. § 240.14a-7. 
141 Id. § 240.14a-4(d)(4).  
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candidate makes the ballot without the efforts of shareholders, management retains 
the advantage by exercising its ability to “blackball” anyone it deems unworthy. 
Taken together, the SEC, through the authority granted to it by Congress, 
established a system of proxy solicitation that those interested in fighting for votes 
must follow closely, and these laws greatly influence the role of corporate 
governance between publicly held corporations and their shareholders.142  If it fails 
to follow the rules, a company may face sanctions from the SEC.143   
C. Online Availability of Proxy Materials 
In a massive step forward in pushing for increased shareholder activism, the 
SEC took steps to make proxy materials available online.  In doing so, it opened 
the door to endless governance possibilities.144  Specifically to address the costs, 
time commitments, and difficult standards associated with the traditional proxy, 
the SEC took action,145 adopting a “notice and access” model that allows 
companies the option to make proxy materials available via the Internet.146  
Although this new set of regulations (Internet rules) passed with the specific intent 
of lowering the costs and increasing the availability of proxies, it could be used for 
an expansive renovation of the current proxy scheme.  This new option became 
effective on July 1, 2007.147   
Perhaps the main downfall of the new regulations is that they are optional, 
which is the most significant change from the original proposed rule.148  The final 
rules addressed four main categories: (1) content and delivery requirements of 
notices; (2) format and posting requirements of notices; (3) safeguards that ensure 
shareholders know they have a right to request paper materials; and (4) procedures 
non-insider solicitors must follow to use the online proxy solicitation method.149  
                                                          
142 See Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era 
of Downsizing and Corporate Reengineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1707 (1996) (reviewing 
LAWRENCE  E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995) and MARK J. ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994)). 
143 See Zukin, supra note 122, at 955. 
144 The new possibilities will be discussed in detail, including how the SEC took back some of the 
power it originally granted to shareholders, later in the paper. 
145 Specifically, the SEC amended the following Rules:  
14a-2, 14a-3, 14a-4, 14a-7, 14a-8, 14a-12, 14a-13, 14b-1, 14b-2, 14c-2, 14c-3, 
14c-5, 14c-7, Schedule 14A, Schedule 14C, Form 10-K, Form 10-KSB, Form 10-
Q, and Form 10-QSB, under the [’34 Act] and Form N-SAR under the [’34 Act] 
and the Investment Company Act of 1940.  [The SEC also added a] new Rule 
14a-16 under the [’34 Act]. 
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-16). 
146 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2007).  
147 Memorandum from Mark S. Bergman, Raphael M. Russo & Frances F. Mi, Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.paulweiss.com/files/ 
Publication/1b89b45d-9121-4f3d-bc0e-0acbe010353a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e013eace-
3dc8-4790-9881-0b26a7be6e40/NewE-ProxyRules26-Jan-07.pdf. 
148 See Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56135, 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240 (July 26, 2007) (stating that its final rule differed slightly from the proposed in that 
issuers could decide if they want to take advantage of the Internet Rules). 
149 Id.  
2009 EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION 295 
 
1. Content and Delivery 
The Internet rules allow a company to provide a shareholder with notice of 
availability (Notice) forty or more calendar days before the annual meeting.150  No 
other information can appear on this Notice so that shareholders will not confuse 
the notice document with the actual proxy card.151  If so, some shareholders might 
become confused, returning the notice document in lieu of the proxy card.  Just as 
the requirements for the statutory prospectus before an IPO, the Notice must offer 
information in “plain English.”152  The company must send the Notice via e-mail 
or traditional mail, and, ten days after initial delivery, the company can deliver the 
proxy card to acquire the shareholder’s vote.153  
There were concerns in some comments on the proposed rule that the Notice 
would invade shareholder privacy and that the Notice would lead to further 
shareholder apathy.154  Some comments indicated that shareholders do not have 
email accounts.155  Probably the most important comment received dealt with 
“phishing” by dastardly individuals taking advantage of unwitting shareholders.156  
While all these issues are very important, if examined under a cost-basis analysis, 
the Internet rules provide more benefits than drawbacks.157 
2. Posting of Information 
There are specific requirements that issuers must meet if they choose to use 
the Internet rules.  For example, issuers must make materials “publicly accessible, 
free of charge, at the Web site address specified in the notice on or before the time 
that the notice is sent to the security holder.”158  To comply, an issuer cannot use 
the SEC’s EDGAR site and the website must preserve the anonymity of each 
shareholder that accesses the materials.159  The information on the web must be 
substantially the same as the paper version of the proxy materials.160  The Notice 
must have the following: a legend in boldface that describes the content represents 
only a notice and that the proxy statement is available online;161 a description of 
                                                          
150 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(a)(1).  
151 Id. § 240.14a-16(e). 
152 Id. § 240.14a-16(g). 
153 Id. § 240.14a-16(h).  
154 Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, supra note 145, at 4148, 4152. 
155 Id. at 4152.  
156 Id. 
157 See generally Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, supra note 145, at 4148, 4162 (providing 
a discussion regarding the cost-benefit analysis of going to a system of internet availability of proxies).  
158 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(b)(1).  
159 Id. § 240.14a-16(b)(3) (emphasis added).  The prohibition on using EDGAR probably comes 
from the desire of the SEC to not subsidize companies by giving them use to a large-scale online 
database.  The SEC could change its policy and require an EDGAR filing fee that would encourage 
more companies to post at a single site to increase the ease on shareholders in finding information.   
160 See id.  
161 Id. § 240.14a-16(d)(1). 
296 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. II:2 
 
the date, time, and location of the annual shareholder meeting;162 and information 
regarding where a shareholder can request the paper form of the proxy 
materials.163  Rule 14a-6, regarding proxy solicitations, still applies, and 
companies must comply with all other applicable provisions.164 
3. Right to Paper Copies 
Another important aspect of the Internet rules is the ability for shareholders 
to request paper copies of the proxy materials.165  Shareholders can request the 
traditional printed form of the proxy materials if they desire.166  The registrant 
must send the information requested within three business days, either by mail or 
by e-mail.167  The burden is on the record owner that requests documents to meet 
the request for paper proxy materials within a reasonable time.168  The SEC did aid 
shareholders by mandating that every notice contain information relating to the 
timeline of which a shareholder can request paper materials.169  The cut-off day for 
requesting copies is one year after the conclusion of the meeting for which the 
proxy materials were applicable.170  Additionally, to further aid privacy interests of 
shareholders, the company issuing paper materials via email cannot use the 
shareholders e-mail address for any other purpose than proxy delivery.171  
It is very important that the SEC regulate the manner in which companies 
treat those that opt out of the Internet rules.  As indicated from the comments 
received by the SEC, many shareholders still find privacy issues with the 
Internet.172  Interestingly enough, though, for a shareholder that opts out of the 
Internet rules, the company can send the same information by e-mail, which could 
be less secure than a website that requires a secure login.  
4. Non-Insider Soliciting Parties 
In addition to providing registrants with the ability to access e-proxies, 
shareholders proposing items to appear in the company proxy report can take 
advantage of the new Internet rules. “Under the proposed rules, a person other than 
the issuer who undertakes his or her own proxy solicitation . . . would be able to 
rely on the . . . ‘notice and access’ model.”173  As the SEC contemplated, this could 
                                                          
162 Id. § 240.14a-16(d)(2). 
163 Id. § 240.14a-16(d)(5).  
164 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(i). 
165 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(j)(2).  
166 See id. § 240.14a-16(j)(2).  
167 Id. § 240.14a-16(j)(1)–(2). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. § 240.14a-16(j)(3).  
171 Id. § 240.14a-16(k)(2).  
172 Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598, 74,607 (Dec. 15, 2005), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-52926fr.pdf. 
173 Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598, 74,607 (Dec. 15, 2005), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-52926fr.pdf.  
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aid shareholders involved in a proxy contest with management by lowering the 
costs associated with the process.174  The requirements for soliciting persons rather 
than a company are substantially similar to those listed above.  One difference is 
that the soliciting person may send out a notice by the later of forty days before the 
shareholder meeting or ten calendar days after the date the registrant first sent its 
proxy statement.175  This allows a solicitor to examine the company’s statement 
and then decide if he will initiate an opposing proxy.  The Internet rules also 
require that soliciting parties send copies of proxy materials only to those whom 
they sent a Notice, thereby eliminating the need for wide availability.176 
Some practitioners believe that this new ability to solicit e-proxies will 
encourage more proxy contests, a conclusion which has factual grounding.177  It 
will be interesting to watch whether the SEC makes the Internet rules mandatory in 
the future.  This decision will largely turn on whether companies take advantage of 
the new Internet rules.  If the SEC makes the rules mandatory, the climate of 
corporate governance will forever change in America.  Note that these are the key 
provisions of the new Internet rules.  Certainly, this progressive move on the part 
of the SEC is a new move towards embracing better technology to increase 
efficiency and information sharing among investors.  It is too early to examine the 
effectiveness of the Internet rules, but it seems certain that some shareholders 
could see this as an opportunity to play an active role in governance.  That is, until 
the SEC pulled the rug from under the reform. 
D. Maintaining the Norm 
After taking the time and expending the effort to provide companies and 
shareholders the ability to engage in active governance by developing a practical 
approach to proxy solicitation, the SEC, after a long debate, made a decision that 
made any new policies to encourage active shareholders moot.  Why is it that the 
SEC decided not to go further in its seemingly designed effort to shift more power 
and control to the shareholders?  This section deals with the SEC’s struggle with 
shareholder access to a company’s proxy materials for purposes of nominating 
directors.   
1. Background 
The first movement to give shareholders more access to the corporate ballot 
came in 1942.178  At that time, the proposal would have given minority 
shareholders the ability to include names of potential directors they desired on the 
                                                          
174 See id. 
175 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(l)(2)(i)–(ii).  
176 Id. § 240.14a-16(l)(1). 
177 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL L.L.P., PROXY SOLICITATION THROUGH THE INTERNET, Dec. 14, 
2006, at 3, http://www.adrbny.com/files/SO19088.pdf.  
178 SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, STAFF REPORT: 
REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 2 (July 
15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf [hereinafter PROXY REPORT]. 
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company’s proxy statement.179  The SEC did not adopt the suggested proposals.180  
Though it took another thirty-five years, the SEC again took focus on shareholder 
access to corporate ballots through the proxy process.181  This time, the 
Commission examined shareholder communication, shareholder participation, and 
general corporate governance.182  The SEC did adopt regulations that required 
companies to produce disclosure regarding whether they had a nominating 
committee that would entertain shareholder proposals.183  It did not, however, 
adopt or address any other issues to provide for shareholders access.184  The 
Commission did acknowledge that if many companies did not adopt nomination 
committees, it would have to take action to ensure that shareholders had access to 
the proxy process.185 
In 1992, the SEC revisited the issue and acknowledged that shareholders 
were having little success accessing corporate ballots or even getting their 
proposals to nomination committees.186  However, the SEC recognized that 
[p]roposals to require the company to include shareholder nominees in the 
company’s proxy statement would represent a substantial change in the 
Commission’s proxy rules.  This would essentially mandate a universal ballot 
including both management nominees and independent candidates for board 
seats.187 
The SEC did permit shareholders to utilize Rule 14a-4(d) to indicate board 
candidates they opposed,188  but this reform still does not give shareholders the 
true power to make a difference.  Note that shareholders do have the ability to 
conduct an election contest by following the above-mentioned proxy rules, but, 
even after the new Internet Rules, the costs associated with this are very large.189 
2. Recent Challenges and Interpretations 
In 2003, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees Pension Plan (AFSCME) requested a no-action letter to determine 
whether its proposal for including the representative of a group of shareholders 
owning three percent could be excluded from a proxy statement by American 
                                                          
179 Id. 
180 Id.  The SEC gave no specific reasons for refusing to adopt the proposal, simply stating, “A 
number of the suggestions proposed by the staff were not adopted.”  SEC Release No. 34-3347 (Dec. 
18, 1942); see also Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R.s 1493, 1821, 
2019 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. (1943) (testimony of 
SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell). 
181 PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 3. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation, in the Corporate Electoral Process 
and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 34-14970 (July 18, 1978). 
185 PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 4. 
186 Id. 
187 Regulation of Communications Among Shareholder, 53 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992). 
188 See PROXY REPORT, supra note 178. 
189 PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 5; see discussion supra Part III.B–C. 
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International Group, Inc. (AIG), pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(8).190  In response, the 
SEC “issued a no-action letter in which it indicated that it would not recommend 
an enforcement action against AIG should the Company exclude the Proposal from 
its proxy statement.”191  After AIG excluded the proposal, AFSCME sued to 
compel AIG to include its proposal in the company’s proxy report.192  The district 
court ruled for AIG, and the case went on appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.193 
The issue on appeal was whether the shareholder proposal “relate[d] to an 
election” for purposes of Rule 14a-8(i)(8).194  The court pointed to two contrasting 
interpretations by the SEC regarding proper exclusions, one from 1976, and one 
submitted in an amicus brief to the court.195  The court, based on the conflicting 
interpretations, held that a company could exclude proposals that related to an 
instant election, but that the language of the regulation said nothing about 
excluding proposals for future elections.196  Thus, it determined that AIG 
improperly excluded AFSCME’s proposals, but it hedged its holding regarding the 
issue of shareholder’s access to the corporate ballot:  
[W]e take no side in the policy debate regarding shareholder access to the corporate 
ballot.  There might be perfectly good reasons for permitting companies to exclude 
proposals like AFSCME’s, just as there may well be valid policy reasons for 
rendering them non-excludable.  However, Congress has determined that such 
issues are appropriately the province of the SEC, not the judiciary.197 
Though not entirely punting on the difficult issue, the Second Circuit made a 
pass on deciding a key issue, thus opening the door to many new interpretations.   
3. “Clarification” Provided by the SEC 
Realizing that its conflicting interpretations thirty years apart would lead to 
further litigation, and because the holding of the Second Circuit conflicted with 
decisions of other circuit courts,198 the SEC announced that it was going to begin 
taking comment on possible new changes to the ‘34 Act Regulations, specifically 
those regarding shareholders’ ability to nominate directors.199  Its decision to do so 
must have come in light of the Second Circuit thumbing its nose at the SEC, 
especially regarding prior interpretations of a very controversial issue.  
Specifically, the SEC stated that its “position that the election exclusion should not 
                                                          
190 American International Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 235, 
2005 WL 372266 (Feb 14, 2005). 
191 AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2006). 
192 AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 344, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
193 Id. at 348. 
194 AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 125. 
195 Id. at 126. 
196 Id. at 127–28. 
197 Id. at 130–31. 
198 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 92 SEC Docket 256, at 9 (Jan. 10, 
2008). 
199 PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 1. 
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be, and was not originally intended to be, limited” by the Second Circuit’s 
preference on the 1976 interpretation.200  Further, the Commission cited a recent 
United States Supreme Court case where the interpretation of agency rules by the 
Second Circuit was in question.201  In that case, the Court determined that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own rules is controlling unless the interpretation is 
clearly erroneous, notwithstanding possible different interpretations over the 
course of many years.202  Armed with a favorable Supreme Court ruling and 
determined to decrease the amount of uncertainty surrounding the shareholder 
access interpretation, the SEC began analyzing the fate of Rule 14a-8(i)(8). 
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox had one time stated that he wanted to 
expand the influence of shareholders in proxy contests,203 yet when the vote came 
before the Commission in July of 2007, he voted both for and against the new 
proposal.204  The initial proposal by Democrats called for a five percent threshold 
requirement that shareholders would have to meet to reach the ballot; the initial 
proposal by Republicans called for a continued bar for shareholders seeking to 
access corporate ballots.205  Subsequently, on January 10, 2008, the SEC made its 
decision, confirming its 1990 interpretation, and further modifying Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) to exclude any proposal that “would set up a process for shareholders to 
conduct an election contest in the future by requiring the company to include 
shareholders’ director nominees in the company’s proxy materials for subsequent 
meetings.”206  Not only did the SEC prevent shareholders from setting up future 
contested elections, but it also went through with action that opposed the original 
intent as stated by Chairman Cox, and the SEC continued its blockade against 
shareholders seeking to engage in nominating directors to a company’s board.207 
                                                          
200 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, supra note 198, at 10.   
201 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
202 Id. at 2349. 
203 Kara Scannell, SEC Chairman’s Proxy Pitch Loses Steam, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at C11. 
204 Kara Scannell, SEC’s Solomon? Cox Splits Vote on Proxy Access, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2007, 
at C1 (emphasis added). 
205 Id. 
206 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, supra note 198, at 13.  
207 Specifically, the SEC stated, “We believe that the clarifying rule amendment is consistent with 
the agency’s longstanding interpretation of the election exclusion and that the references to 
‘nomination’ and ‘procedure’ in the rule text appropriately reflect the purpose of the exclusion.”  Id. at 
18.  That might be well and true, but the overarching issue the SEC seemed to avoid was, if it changed 
its approach regarding the nomination exclusion, it would have had to address many other issues 
relating to contested election disclosures and new interpretations of several other proxy provisions.  See 
id. at 3–6.  This paper does not suggest the SEC was lazy, but it does look very suspicious, given its 
recent move towards empowering shareholders by making proxy materials more readily available.  
Even in its description of the Election Exclusion in the Proposed Rule that the SEC put out for 
comment, it reiterated the disclosure issue: “The proper functioning of the election exclusion is critical 
to prevent the circumvention of other proxy rules that are carefully crafted to ensure that investors 
receive adequate disclosure in election contests.”  Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of 
Directors, 91 SEC Docket 575 (July 27, 2007) (emphasis added).  It continued by stating that, if 
shareholders wanted to replace directors, they would need to go through the proxy process.  Id.   This 
could be a reasonable conclusion, and the SEC did make it easier to engage in a proxy contest recently, 
but the analysis still seems weak.   
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E. Future Implications 
In explaining the proxy system, detailing its new reform, and providing 
information that leads one to conclude the SEC recognizes the problem of 
executive overcompensation, it is apparent that the SEC has established the 
groundwork for increasing shareholder information and participation.  The SEC 
recognized the potential of the Internet, implemented appropriate regulations that 
would help companies and shareholders open lines of communication, and 
displayed it was working to attain the goals listed in its mission statement.208  
These changes should signal the beginning of a new era of corporate governance; 
however, the SEC has reinforced its blockade to limit shareholders’ ability to reach 
the ballot.209  Thus, the SEC has stalled in taking advantage of the invaluable asset 
the Internet provides.  Why else would the SEC work as it did when it expects 
shareholders not to respond?  In the era of Enron and WorldCom, it is evident that 
much is required to avert further economic disasters due to weak corporate boards 
and managers.  Greater proxy availability will address the collective action 
problems.210  As Professor Bernard Black explains, “Shareholder passivity may be 
partly a function of the legal rules” that impose great restrictions on investors who 
want to become active in corporate governance.211  In the changing proxy 
environment, it seems very possible that many shareholders will be inclined to read 
the materials available in a form that allows for paperless examination and become 
an active participator in the decision-making process.  For example, a shareholder 
that normally takes a passive approach, i.e., checking every box management 
suggested, upon receiving a proxy request, if he received this solicitation online, 
might take an extra five minutes of his day to investigate some issues presented.  
The Internet provides access to much information, both reliable and 
questionable in nature.  If a shareholder has a proposal for changing a policy or 
norm on the company’s proxy statement, an investor that usually acquiesces might 
engage in a Google search to research any issues presented, thus producing a 
better-informed and reasoned vote.  The Internet rules will not provide the 
definitive result to make every passive investor engage in informative governance 
and it will not overcome, by itself, the collective action problem, but it should 
encourage a new movement and approach towards more meaningful and beneficial 
corporate governance.  Mainly, the increased access and lower costs will help 
those shareholders that have holdings beyond that of what the everyday passive 
investor would have, such as pension funds, insurance companies, and other 
institutional investors.  This in turn could change the environment that currently 
exists where the voting rights that shareholders hold—emphasized in the 
theoretical educational setting and corporate finance courses as the benefit that 
overcomes the disadvantage of only having a residual claim to corporate assets—
                                                          
208 See the discussion above. 
209 See discussion above and below. 
210 See Phyllis Plitch, SEC’s Online Plan to Cut Costs May Rally Dissident Investors, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 27, 2005, at C3; discussion infra Part IV.B.   
211 Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 566 (1990). 
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have largely become ceremonial.212   
IV. INEFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Because the SEC continues to take its line against allowing shareholders the 
ability to access the corporate ballot, there must be some other way to control the 
executive overcompensation problem.  This section of the paper provides analysis 
of the various ways and means executive compensation could be controlled, but 
has not due to a myriad of reasons.  Specifically, the next sections analyze the 
ineffectiveness of the new SEC disclosure rules and the enormous loopholes and 
exceptions installed in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) by Congress that have 
both failed in their attempt to control executive compensation.  Although possible 
solutions to aid the shortcomings will be provided, the main problem seems to be 
the dedication of the SEC and Congress to address the issue.   
A. SEC Disclosure Rules 
One constant trait of the SEC is its consistent use of rulings to address issues 
that come about in the market.  One issue the SEC routinely addresses is how 
executive compensation disclosure should appear on ‘34 Act companies proxy 
materials.  Though the executive compensation issue was not as pervasive through 
the early part of the twentieth century, it has become increasingly important as the 
pay packages increase to gargantuan proportions.  Beginning in 1938, the SEC has 
regularly issued releases and final rulings regarding compensation disclosures, 
sometimes aiming to increase narrative disclosure, sometimes aiming for tabular or 
graphical disclosures, and sometimes both.213  The idea each time is to encourage 
companies to list information in plain English that would be easily understandable, 
but not overly uniform as to appear like boilerplate language.214   
Thus, in 1992, the SEC adopted another new set of rules under Regulation S-
K “[t]o improve shareholders’ understanding of all forms of compensation paid to 
senior executives and directors, the criteria used by the board of directors in 
reaching compensation decisions, and the degree of relationship between 
compensation and corporate performance.”215  Specifically, the regulations provide 
                                                          
212 See Seth W. Ashby, Note, Strengthening the Public Company Board of Directors: Limited 
Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 521, 528 (2005).   
213 See, e.g., Disclosure of Executive Compensation, SEC Release No. 33-6486, 48 Fed. Reg. 
44,467 (Sept. 23, 1983) (calling for the use of tables to describe compensation not based in equity); 
Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,430, 11,431 (Dec. 11, 
1952) (requiring tables for pension and deferred compensation); Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18, 1942) (requiring tables in the disclosure forms); 
Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823, 3 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1992 (Aug. 13, 1938) 
(providing the first rules regarding disclosure of how boards determine executive compensation).  
214 For purposes of this paper, the last three releases will be discussed. 
215 Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 
229, 240, 249).  Regulation S-K disclosures include items that a ’34 Act company must disclose to the 
SEC but do not fall within the traditional definition of financial information.  See Regulation S-K, 
MoneyGlossary.com, http:// www.moneyglossary.com/?w=Regulation+S-K (last visited Mar. 29, 
2008).  
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that companies must list the compensation paid to the top executives in a Summary 
Compensation Table to allow shareholders the ability to examine easily any 
proposed pay packages.216  A board’s compensation committee must also include, 
per the regulations, reports on how well the executives met the company’s 
performance standards.217  Finally, the compensation committee must list the 
cumulative total return to shareholders in the form of a line graph and another 
graph to allow shareholders to examine the return of the S&P 500 or return of any 
peer companies in the registrant’s industry. 218 
In 2003, the SEC again adopted rules in an attempt to “increase shareholder 
awareness of and involvement in the executive compensation decision-making 
process.”219  Additionally, the Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”)—NYSE 
and NASDAQ—procured new standards to expand shareholder approval 
requirements for executive compensation.220  These new changes came in the wake 
of the Enron disaster and related specifically to the full disclosure of all equity 
payments to executives.221  In 2006, the SEC again proposed new rules to “provide 
investors with a clearer and more complete picture of compensation to principal 
executive officers, principal financial officers, the other highest paid executive 
officers and directors.”222  These disclosure rules seek to provide information on 
deferred compensation for the three recent fiscal years.223  Importantly, these new 
rules require disclosure of personal benefits executives receive in excess of 
$10,000, but “[a]n item is not a perquisite or personal benefit if it is integrally and 
directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties.”224  There is also a 
requirement that companies disclose executives’ total compensation.225  The 
purpose of this requirement “is to eliminate the ‘holy-cow moment’ when 
shareholders learn the CEO is about to collect” massive amounts of deferred 
compensation.226  Requiring disclosure of total compensation might be the most 
successful requirement to date because it will give shareholders a quantifiable and 
                                                          
216 Executive Compensation Doctrine, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,127 (1992). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 McClendon, supra note 30, at 976. 
220 Id.  A discussion on the role of SROs is well-beyond the scope of this paper.  It is of note, that 
in the American market, SROs play a very important role in “private” regulation of companies that list 
with them.  They are important mainly because they provide another layer of regulation and protection 
to an industry that tends to freak people out when times are bumpy and their savings seems to be wilting 
away.  The SEC and SROs piggyback on each other when it comes to implementing new regulations 
and disclosure rules, sometimes one looking to the other to implement major controversial changes.  
What is certain is that SROs are necessary to the market, and their effectiveness could expand if the 
SEC fails to put more power in the shareholders’ hands.   
221 Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan Information, SEC Release No. 8,048, 17 C.F. R. § 
228-29, 240, 249 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8048.htm; see also 
Janet Whitman, Stock Options Face Scrutiny in Wake of Enron, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B7B. 
222 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8655, 71 
Fed. Reg. 6,542, 6,543, 17 C.F.R. §§ 22-29, 239-40, 245, 249, 274) (Feb. 8, 2006). 
223 Id. at 6,543.   
224 Id. at 6,553. 
225 Id. 
226 Martin, supra note 5, at 152 (quoting Gretchen Morgenson, A ‘Holy Cow’ Moment in Payland, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 3, at 1). 
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comparable number as opposed to a figure discounted to its present value or 
adjusted for “other” accounting purposes.  Still, some figures might lose context 
within all of the information provided.   
In short, the SEC has sought to make executive pay package disclosure 
simple to read, analyze, and understand—which happens to be the same purpose of 
the SEC for the past seventy years.227  Sometimes the simplest representations do 
not convey the overarching problems they seek to address.  The tables and graphs 
include objects such as options and grants, which to the normal shareholder has 
little meaning.228  The trouble with the disclosure rules is that companies have 
simply just taken their other filings, including the 10-K and 10-Q, and just relisted 
some information and rearranged other materials.229  This boilerplate language 
complies with the law, but does little to expose the outrageous behavior of some 
companies regarding executive pay packages.  Although the SEC has consistently 
tried to address the use of boilerplate language, it consistently fails to pass 
regulations that press companies to use specialized and specific drafting. 
Additionally, with the many regulations, the SEC still takes the position that it 
seeks to improve only disclosure and not institute wage controls.230  Therefore, to 
the SEC, transparency is the key to effective governance and to controlling 
executive compensation.  The many rules and interpretations are well intended but, 
given the number and frequency, they seem ineffective.   
Before discussing whether the SEC could control executive compensation 
through transparency, and given Chairman Cox’s statements that the market should 
always control, does the SEC have any intention in even trying to help control the 
problem?  Further, does the SEC think there is a problem?  It is logical to conclude 
that the SEC recognizes a problem because of the many regulations, 
interpretations, and proposals it has issued over the past seventy years.  Provided 
that background, there are steps the SEC could take to produce better results.   
The SEC could call for disclosure of useful information in a manner that one 
can analyze independent from any other items, such as the pay ratios of the 
executives compared to other employees.231  By only requiring disclosure of the 
executives’ compensation, sometimes in a percentage form, the current rules allow 
for a company to skew the real figures.  The disclosures do not require companies 
to state performance targets; thus, shareholders have no clue whether the 
executives are meeting the outlined objectives232 that the shareholders approved.233  
                                                          
227 Id. at 150. 
228 See id. at 150.  
229 See Scott P. Spector, The Compensation Committee Report, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC 
PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULE 4.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2000). 
230 Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, SEC Chairman’s Opening Statement: Proposed Revisions to 
the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006) (transcript available 
at. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm).  SEC Chairman Cox is the poster-boy 
marketer: the “market is capable of disciplining excessive compensation, provided that the market has 
adequate information.”   Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose Overhaul of Rules on Executive Pay, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 10, 2006, at A2.   
231 Stabile, supra note 62, at 162. 
232 For a company to deduct payments to executives beyond $1 million, they must submit 
performance standards for approval to the shareholders.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.   
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The SEC should require detailed disclosure of these targets and any other goals.  It 
seems that there is a lack of dedication with the SEC’s rules that makes them 
resemble only “feel-good” rulemaking.  There is little indication that making 
compensation packages widely known would make transparency even work.234  
With the SEC’s lack of initiative to require full and material disclosures combined 
with its recent decision to allow companies to continue barring shareholder board 
nominations, the SEC has proven it to be ineffective, assuming it wants to make 
the effort, in controlling executive overcompensation.   
B. Recent Congressional and Presidential Efforts 
Congress has recently decided to play its hand in the effort to control 
executive compensation.  Both the House and Senate introduced legislation in 
April 2007 to amend Section 14 of the ‘34 Act.  The House version, sponsored by 
Representative Barney Frank, provided for a separate shareholder vote to approve 
executive compensation packages.  However, the effect of this provision was 
greatly hedged by the remaining portion of the proposed legislation.  The 
shareholders’ votes would be advisory.  Specifically,  
The shareholder vote shall not be binding on the corporation or the board of 
directors; nor be construed (1) as overruling a board decision; (2) to create or imply 
additional fiduciary duty by such board; (3) to restrict or limit shareholder ability to 
make proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to executive 
compensation.235 
The legislation also included a provision requiring shareholder approval of 
golden parachutes, but again, any votes by the shareholders would be advisory.  
The Senate version, which consisted of the exact same provisions of the bill 
introduced in the House, was introduced by-then Illinois Junior Senator Barack 
Obama.236  The Senate version was never sent to Committee, and the House 
version was never voted on by the Senate after it passed the House.237  After the 
congressional session ended, the bills were cleared from the books.238  They were 
not reintroduced.239  Instead, now-President Obama proposed and the Treasury 
Department issued regulations limiting executives pay at financial institutions that 
accepted government assistance through TARP.240  The regulations provide a limit 
                                                          
233 Martin, supra note 5, at 162; see Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to 
Performance—Options Grants May Depend on Meeting Financial Goals; Moving Beyond a “Pulse”, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2006, at A1.   
234 Temple University, News Communications, Accounting Professor: Transparency Won’t 
Necessarily Control CEO Pay, available at http://www.temple.edu/newsroom/2007_2008/10/stories/ 
execcomp.htm.   
235 H.R. Res. 1257, 110th Congress (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:hr088.110.pdf. 
236 S. Res 1181, 110th Congress, (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110: 
SN01181:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
237 Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1257. 
238 Id.  
239 Id. 
240 Office of the Press Secretary, Treasury Announces New Restrictions On Executive 
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of $500,000 in total compensation for senior executives, plus restricted stock, and 
require the companies to meet strict disclosure requirements.241  These restrictions 
and requirements only apply to companies that received and will receive assistance 
from the government.242  Thus, it will not have any affect on most American 
corporations.  Though it will take time to determine if this type of restriction will 
be extended to other industries, it appears that Congress may again someday 
introduce legislation to allow shareholders access to the corporate ballot.  
However, with the economy in a deep recession, congressional attention to other 
issues is taking priority over any potential legislation regarding executive pay.  It 
appears that until the economy recovers, there will be little attention by Congress 
to shareholder rights.  Even if Congress does act, if it implements laws that have 
language similar to that quoted above from HR 1257, it may not be enough.  
Furthermore, although the President has taken a hard line with respect to 
compensation limits for executives at companies receiving government assistance, 
it is difficult to determine if the executive branch can maintain the ability to 
monitor and limit executives’ pay at publicly traded corporations.  
C. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) 
The IRC allows for the deduction of all “ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, 
including . . . a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for 
purposes actually rendered.”243  For corporations with enormous cash resources 
and payrolls of accountants, this business deduction would appear to provide an 
unfair competitive advantage.  However, Congress played its hand in an effort to 
control executive compensation.  Though the success of the effort is highly 
questionable, as is using the IRC for social and political policy, it shows that 
Congress recognized a problem exists.  At the suggestion of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, it passed as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
subsection (m) to section 162 (162(m)), which was added to the IRC in an effort to 
limit corporate tax deductions allowed as part of executive compensation.244  This 
provision came about to address the perceived crisis that American industries were 
becoming less competitive internationally, yet executive pay was soaring to new 
record highs.245  The provision appears straightforward, but it has caused much 
critique because of its ineffective ability to influence executive compensation.246   
                                                          
Compensation, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TreasuryAnnouncesNewRestrictionsOn 
ExecutiveCompensation/. 
241 Id.  See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase 
Program Description, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm. 
242 Id.   
243 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2009). 
244 Steven Balsam & David Ryan, Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired 
After the Imposition of 162(m), J. OF ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. (Fall 2007), manuscript available at 
http://astro.temple.edu/~ryan/162m.pdf. 
245 Id. 
246 See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm. on the Effectiveness of § 162(m), at 1 (Sept. 6, 
2006) (Testimony of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting, Temple University Fox School of 
Business), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/090606testsb.pdf 
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1. The Provision 
In relevant part, section 162(m) provides that no publicly held corporation 
may deduct any amount over $1 million paid to employees whom are included 
within the statutory definition of “covered employee.”247  Included in this 
definition are the CEO and the four highest paid executives.248  For purposes of 
section 162(m), a “publicly held corporation” is one registered pursuant to the ‘34 
Act.249  Not included in the statutory cap are non-taxable fringes,250 qualified 
retirement plans, and shareholder-approved performance-based compensation.251  
Unfortunately, the exceptions swallow the rule.  No compensation made in the 
form of commissions or upon meeting the performance goals count toward the 
statutory limit.252  The language of the section shows Congress’ desire to place 
emphasis on publicly held corporations gearing executives’ pay to center around 
their performance.253  To deduct under the performance goals exception, the 
company must follow statutory guidance.  First, a compensation committee 
composed of at least two independent directors must determine the material terms 
for which the company will compensate the executive.254  Next, the company must 
disclose the terms of the pay and obtain approval by a majority of shareholders.255  
Finally, the compensation committee must certify that the performance goals were 
satisfied.256   
2. The Ineffectiveness of 162(m) 
The exceptions provided in the IRC account for why Congress, through the 
IRC, has been ineffective in regulating or restraining the excessive executive 
compensation.  First, companies have shifted to either all commission-based pay, 
or have established easily attainable performance goals to ensure any payments in 
excess of the statutory cap may still be deducted.257  If Congress really intended to 
                                                          
(“section 162(m) has been at best, only marginally effective in limiting executive pay or in making it 
more responsive to performance”) [hereinafter Balsam Testimony]; Polsky, supra note 47, at 920 
(“empirical evidence confirms the intuition that 162(m) is not helpful to shareholders”); McClendon, 
supra note 30, at 1017 (calling for a repeal of section 162(m) because of its emphasis on performance-
based compensation packages); Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive 
Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 101 (1998) (arguing that the I.R.C. has no role in regulating 
compensation). 
247 I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2008).  
248 Id. § 162(m)(3)(A)–(B).  In determining whether an individual is the chief executive officer or 
one of the four highest paid officers, the Tax Regulations cross-reference the disclosure rules 
promulgated by the SEC and discussed earlier in the paper.  Treas. Reg. § 1.162(c)(2)(ii); see discussion 
supra Part IV.A. 
249 Id. § 162(m)(2).  
250 See id. § 132(a). 
251 Balsam & Ryan, supra note 244. 
252 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B)–(C).   
253 See Martin, supra note 5, at 160.  
254 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)–(ii). 
255 Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii). 
256 Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii). 
257 See Balsam & Ryan, supra note 244, at 3; see also Stabile, supra note 246, at 88–89. 
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limit compensation, it should have taken a hard-line approach and removed the 
many exceptions.  Even the argument that safeguards exist so that independent 
directors examine the packages and shareholders approve the performance goals 
holds little weight.  As noted, shareholders play a ministerial role in examining 
proposals, and boards, including independent directors, exercise hardly any true 
negotiating power.  Thus, section 162(m) is wholly ineffective.   
Even if the shareholders do not approve any performance packages, or if the 
independent directors reject a payment package that is performance-based, some 
companies have simply ignored the statutory limitation and paid in excess of the 
statutory cap.258  This raises the issue of a “why bother” attitude in implementing a 
provision like section 162(m) if it will hardly be acknowledged.  The indifference 
exercised by some companies is mindboggling.  Furthermore, data supports some 
critics’ argument that Congress’ efforts actually caused an increase in executive 
pay because of the wide latitude it gave to performance-based compensation.259  
Not only does data show that compensation package amounts are increasing, 
companies have engaged in “grossing up” payments to executives to cover any 
other potential taxes for which they would be liable.  The effects are astounding.  
In “an irony unknown to most . . . CEOs, who may be making hundreds of times 
what the average worker receives, may pay nothing in taxes because shareholders 
pay the taxes for them.”260   
Even within the Treasury Regulations, which the United States Treasury 
Department promulgated to clarify provisions in the IRC, there is additional 
language that seems to cut against the intended purpose of section 162(m), and 
against the overall purpose and goals of the tax system.  Specifically, “in the case 
of excessive payments by corporations, if such payments correspond or bear a 
close relationship to stockholdings, and are found to be a distribution of earning or 
profits, the excessive payments will be treated as a dividend.”261  This is troubling 
because, instead of discouraging excessive payments, companies have incentives, 
if they will not fit under any exception in section 162(m) and are indifferent to the 
consequences, to pay in masked dividends under the Treasury Regulations.  By 
doing so, instead of the executive paying tax at the highest tax bracket,262 the 
companies can assure their executives pay tax on the largest portion of their 
income at the dividend level.263  Thus, not only are companies able to manipulate 
the IRC, they can provide additional benefits to their executives by lowering their 
tax bill.  The result has cost the federal government billions in tax revenue over the 
past fourteen years.264 
                                                          
258 Martin, supra note 5, at 160. 
259 See Polsky, supra note 47, at 920; Brian Grow & Eamon Javers, Executive Pay Practices Under 
Scrutiny: Companies’ Skirting of a Tax Rule Meant to Spur Performance-Based Pay Contributed to the 
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260 Martin, supra note 5, at 160–61. 
261 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (West 2008). 
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263 See id. § 1(h)(11)(D)(i).   
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The Internal Revenue Service has established a compliance program to root 
out the many incidents of corporations establishing simple performance goals, 
disregarding the statutory cap, or grossing up pay to executives.265  Corporations 
are exercising too much leverage over Congress, shareholders, and the economy.  
Further revision is required if Congress really desires to put some dent into the 
increasing overcompensation problem.  Specifically, the IRC must not give such 
leeway to options and other performance-based compensation.  It could require 
that options price at market-adjusted levels and then reclassify as ordinary 
remuneration.266  The performance goals exception could require stringent 
disclosure and increased performance-based requirements that use completely 
objective criteria.  Additionally, corporations should be required to detail any tax 
benefits given up or penalties incurred by choosing to ignore section 162(m).  With 
the current situation, any of these suggestions seem highly unlikely, but if any 
changes occur, what is the probability that any court or the IRS would be willing to 
intervene?  Building upon the deferential attitude and business judgment rule, 
courts, even specialized administrative courts like the tax court, hesitate to 
intervene in market-driven decisions.267  As written, section 162(m) overlooks—
perhaps by choice—the true problems associated with performance-based 
compensation.  It has not led to a reduction in CEO compensation,268 and if no 
modification is reasonable, Congress must reevaluate using the IRC for this 
purpose.  
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266 See Balsam Testimony, supra note 246, at 3.   
267 See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (2007) (stating that the 
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Id. at n.17 (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 
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has been widely adopted, and it is unlikely a tax court would change from precedent.   
268 Balsam & Ryan, supra note 244, at 7. 
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3. Policy Concerns 
A broader argument can be made that Congress should not use the IRC to 
attempt to control executive compensation.  Using the IRC for reasons not 
associated with tax policy seems questionable.269  “It is clear that [section] 162(m) 
is not grounded in tax policy considerations; . . . executive compensation ought to 
be deductible in full . . . . Rather, the provision is simply a penalty that is 
administered through the [IRC].”270  Not only does section 162(m) have no basis in 
tax policy, it has been wholly ineffective.271  If Congress starts extending the 
purposes of the IRC beyond that of tax considerations, this could lead to confusion 
and outcry by the American people.  Americans are adverse to paying taxes, recall 
the American Revolution, and if Congress makes a habit of using the IRC to 
regulate additional private-party compensation, healthcare, or education—all 
reasonable in the face of section 162(m)—the American market could suffer 
irreparable harm due to massive protest.  Maybe the SEC should have the lead in 
this purpose.  Still, some argue that any type of compensation decisions should be 
entirely up to market determination, thus keeping Congress out of the equation.272  
As previously discussed, this approach has failed to control the problem.273  
Although well intended, 162(m) proves to be ineffective because of wide 
exceptions, corporate indifference, and potential improper politically based uses 
for the IRC.   
V. INCREASING THE SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
First, this paper provided analysis and discussion for why passivity on 
corporate boards has led to overconfident and powerful executives that dictate 
compensation terms to directors.274  Then the paper outlined the role the SEC plays 
in corporate governance, particularly in the proxy area.275  Next, it described how 
the SEC refused to make the next logical step in the new era of governance by 
continuing to allow boards to ignore shareholder proposals regarding nominating 
                                                          
269 See e.g., Polsky, supra note 47, at 884; McClendon, supra note 30, at 1017 (noting that other 
regulatory schemes exist for better controlling executive compensation packages); Yablon, supra note 
2, at 281, 293–95 (indicating the negative influence §162(m) has had on executive pay); cf. Stabile, 
supra note 246, at 95 (“Congress consistently uses the tax laws to accomplish objectives that are not tax 
related.”). 
270 Polsky, supra note 47, at 884. 
271 See discussion supra Part IV.C.2. 
272 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 246, at 98.  Professor Stabile has a very interesting approach.  She 
first condemns those that argue the I.R.C. has no place in regulating political issues, but then describes 
that the government should stay clear of regulating anything related to compensation.  Id. at 94, 98–99.  
This position is defended by saying that, provided a corporations’ shareholders have full knowledge of 
executive pay packages and do not object, the decisions should be treated as legitimate.  Id. at 101.  
This contradicts her earlier argument that Congress should regulate executive compensation as a matter 
of social policy to prevent the widening gap in pay between the top and bottom in a corporation.  Id. at 
99–100.  It appears to be a conservative approach to market regulation, but a liberal approach to societal 
welfare, which is a position that might be impossible to sustain.   
273 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
274 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
275 See discussion supra Part III.B–C. 
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directors.276  Then, the paper discussed how the SEC, through requiring increased 
disclosure, and Congress, though its efforts in the IRC, failed to control executive 
overcompensation.277  Those sections cumulatively laid the foundation for an 
argument that the internet, a re-interpretation of one SEC Rule, and shareholders, 
working together, hold the key to limiting executive compensation.  Shareholders 
must be motivated and be given the ability and opportunity to monitor and control 
passive corporate boards that rubber-stamp poor management decisions.  If the 
SEC were to allow shareholders the ability to reach the ballot, the nomination 
process would resemble a type of campaign, where potential directors would 
explain to voting shareholders how they intend to increase firm efficiency. 
A. The Meaning of Corporate Governance 
Governance in the corporate context developed in the 1980s to describe the 
struggle between shareholders and directors to establish the “structure, 
relationships, norms, control mechanisms, and objectives of the corporate 
enterprise.”278  An idea by some concludes that companies perform with the 
shareholders remaining at all times on the sideline, deferring to management and 
the board with unquestioned trust.279  This position holds that, provided 
shareholders have the power to make changes, they will drain the corporation of 
capital by constant demands.280  In response, how can anyone argue that the 
exorbitant pay packages given to executives do not do the same thing?  At least the 
efforts of shareholder activists would target removing one draining source in hopes 
of replacing it with something more sustainable and accountable.  However, before 
increasing the activity of the average shareholder to address this issue, a glaring 
problem exists: the collective action problem.  For any possible way to increase 
activism, there is a need to either increase the power shareholders have with their 
limited voting rights, or make any efforts by shareholders to participate have little 
cost. 
The true meaning of corporate governance is lost on corporations and foreign 
to shareholders.  The “traditional” approach to governance in the State of Delaware 
is one that provides managers with great authority to pursue different business 
                                                          
276 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
277 See discussion supra Part IV.A–B. 
278 Veasey & DiGugliemlo, supra note 1, at 1411. 
279 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Corporations Shouldn’t Be Democracies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007, 
at A17.  Professor Stout wrote this commentary in strong opposition to the proposed SEC rules 
regarding nominations of directors by shareholders.  See id. 
280 Id.  Professor Stout defends her position by claiming that the United Kingdom, well known for 
its openness to shareholder rights, “would be a corporate powerhouse,” but instead, countries like the 
United States and Japan, both notoriously shareholder right adverse, dominate the landscape.  Id.  This 
argument fails to recognize the realities of the situation.  The United States came into major financial 
power after World War II, which was an event that completely devastated the economies of Europe—
and Japan.  However, the Japanese were able to recover much more quickly due to their amazing 
development of technologically advanced products.  Things have worked against the British more so.  
The tide is turning, though, as evidenced by the fight of the NYSE and the London Stock Exchange for 
listing dominance.    
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opportunities and little restraint.281  Shareholders have a limited role, including the 
ability to vote on fundamental transactions—namely mergers; elect directors 
annually—normally by proxy; obtain access to company records—as required by 
the SEC; and sue directors for not upholding fiduciary duties—severely limited by 
state exculpatory clauses.282  The traditional approach is one that favors executive 
autonomy.  This has its basis in wanting directors and managers to make riskier 
decisions and not fear intervention from possible annoying shareholders concerned 
about potential losses.283  In fact, Vice Chancellor Leo J. Strine, Jr. of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery284 stated, “The primary goal of corporate law . . . is 
not to prevent failure at each and every firm to the fullest extent possible, but to 
facilitate maximum creation of durable societal wealth by all firms.”285  Though 
that has a positive ring, the truth is that the traditionalists have completely quieted 
the shareholders.  To have true corporate governance, as contemplated by the 
meaning of the term, the shareholders must have more influence. 
B. Overcoming the Collective Action Problem 
The most logical argument against allowing shareholders more power is that, 
even given the opportunity, the collective action problem would not lead to results.  
The collective action problem occurs when dispersed shareholders, who lack the 
power to make significant changes individually, remain passive in their decisions, 
even though they might oppose a proffered position.  It is easy to understand why 
this would be such a problem in the context of publicly traded companies in the 
United States.  The idea of a publicly traded company having a majority 
shareholder is almost unconceivable in today’s standards.  Still, for any changes to 
occur regarding executive pay packages, the shareholders that own larger blocks of 
shares must have the opportunity to affect change they desire.  As the system 
stands, they have no power and must put complete reliance on the board of 
directors, who normally have interests aligned with executives. 
To overcome the collective action problem, the SEC, as part of needed 
overhaul, could, in the ‘34 Act Regulations, offer shareholders economic 
incentives for engaging in governance.  It could offer reimbursement for costs 
associated with replacing boards when private shareholders go through the proxy 
process.286  This could aid in preventing the free-rider problem from negatively 
affecting those shareholders that are willing to be active.  As already established, 
the proxy rules changed significantly in the past two years, and Internet rules will 
greatly decrease the costs associated with proxy contests.   
                                                          
281 See Strine, Jr., supra note 85, at 1762. 
282 See id. 
283 See id. at 1763. 
284 The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely known as the preeminent court for corporate 
disputes.  It is a court of equity, specifically dealing in injunctions and declaratory relief.  For a “short” 
history and other information, see William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery: 1792–1992, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20of%20 
Chancery/?history.htm. 
285 Strine, Jr., supra note 85, at 1764. 
286 Bebchuk,  supra note 41, at 1799.  
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This new system would most benefit the large-owner shareholders, such as 
pension funds and insurance companies.  For example, the state pension fund in 
California, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), 
would likely take advantage of new rules that allowed it more access to corporate 
ballots.  CalPERS uses its financial clout—$131 billion in over 1800 American 
companies—to engage in corporate governance by simply posting a list of 
companies whose policies it disagrees with, most recently targeting the Xerox 
Company and others.287  It is reasonable to assume that if the SEC opened the 
door, CalPERS would increase its governance activities.  This example is one of 
many that would likely occur.   
This paper does not suggest that the average shareholder—Ordinary Joe—
who invests with a life-long friend that is his broker will care enough to engage in 
challenging an incumbent board of directors.  That position would be unreasonable 
and unrealistic.  However, the large-block owners—insurance firms, brokerage 
firms, mutual funds—do have an incentive to become more active, especially if the 
SEC allows them to do so.  The aim is not to increase the governance activities of 
Ordinary Joe, but to increase the activity of those who deal with the money of ten 
thousand Ordinary Joes.  The large-block owners would have various incentives, 
one of them including advertising and goodwill possibilities where they describe 
their activism in the market.  Through their advertising, the Ordinary Joes might be 
more willing to invest with a large-block shareholder than with a passive large-
block owner.  Furthermore, these large-block investors are likely to engage in the 
type of behavior required to change a corporation only after it observes long-term 
deficiencies in its business structure.288  Even that type of power, if provided, 
would alter the way most companies engage in business.  It seems simple, but also 
effective.   
A main proponent for keeping the status quo, especially regarding measures 
to address the collective action problem, is Professor Stephen Bainbridge.289  He 
observes:  
If investors valued the rights [to increasing power in corporate governance], we 
would expect to observe entrepreneurs who are taking a company public to offer 
such rights either through appropriate provisions in the firm’s organic documents or 
by lobbying state legislatures to provide such rights off the rack in the corporation 
code.290   
This argument fails to recognize, first, that an entrepreneur might not have the 
same interests as a large-block shareholder that aims to affect corporate policy.  
Primarily, this type of investor would desire to retain control over the corporation, 
unwilling to cede any control to the shareholders, in an effort to retain as much 
                                                          
287 David R. Baker, JDS aims to change pay system, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 17, 2003, 
at B3. 
288 See Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 111, at 876. 
289 Professor Bainbridge is a Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law.  UCLA School of Law 
Faculty Profile, http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=409.  He is a supporter of the current 
“director primacy” regime.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006).  
290 Id. at 1737. 
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control over the business plan as possible.  This might not be such a bad thing, at 
the beginning, because drastic intervention from shareholders could lead to 
confused goals or irreconcilable changes in practice.  It is only after a company 
establishes itself, produces, and then becomes too comfortable with those that got 
it there, will any outside influence be important.   
Second, as already shown, if Congress cannot and will not address the issue, 
why would state legislatures be able to do any better?  Delaware would never 
dream of such a position, given that the majority of its state income comes from 
the revenues it receives on corporate charters.291  In the ever-increasing 
incorporation competition among states, aptly named the race-to-the-bottom, a 
move to increase shareholder power in Delaware would assure that a state like 
Nevada would become the new hotbed for incorporation.292  The fact is that the 
directors and managers of publicly traded companies do not want their 
shareholders to have more power.  This is exactly why the SEC should review its 
analysis and decision to allow companies to continue to exclude shareholder 
proposals, namely when they relate to the election of directors.  No state that seeks 
the revenue from franchise taxes and corporate charters would be willing to put 
themselves on the “cutting edge” of shareholder rights reform, mainly because of 
the competitive nature of the business.  This is why federal intervention to level the 
field among all players is required.  Regardless of the form, the substance is that 
the shareholders, once comfortably passive, seem ready to take a more active role 
in the businesses they own.   
C. Nominating Directors to the Board 
The board, and only the board, has the power to hire and negotiate pay 
packages with the CEO.293  Therefore, the SEC should reexamine its position and 
interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and implement a workable system that addresses 
the growing movement to increasing shareholder activism.  The current position—
”Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude 
[shareholders’] proposal, . . . [i]f the proposal relates to an election for membership 
on the company’s board of directors or analogous governing body”294—is directly 
adverse to the idea of effective corporate governance.  At the beginning of 
research, the SEC sat mulling over challenges to its interpretation to Rule 14a-
8(i)(8).  Since that time, the SEC has delivered a devastating blow, citing 
disclosure concerns as the cornerstone of the opposition,295  to possibly active 
shareholders, like the AFSCME, that desired to make changes in the structure of a 
                                                          
291 See id. at 1742 (acknowledging that the more charters incorporated in a particular state, the 
more taxes and fees it collects).   
292 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 383, 396 (2003); see also Bainbridge, supra note 289, at 1742 (calling the completion for 
charters between states “competitive federalism”).  
293 Dorff, supra note 58, at 2028; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007). (“The business 
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors.”). 
294 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2007).   
295 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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publicly traded company.296   
As the current governance system stands, shareholders have no other 
(legitimate) way to influence or replace directors.  For instance, the business 
judgment rule insulates directors from liability.297  Shareholders may also let their 
feet do the talking and sell their equitable ownership in a company to another.  
Even if they do so, the problems remain.  Finally, unlike the directors that sit on a 
current board, shareholders must bear proxy costs without the aid of corporate 
finances.298  In response to the SEC’s proposal for shareholder access, and 
“[r]eflecting concern over the lack of accountability of corporate directors and 
recent corporate scandals, the commenters generally urged the Commission to 
adopt rules that would grant shareholders greater access to the nomination process 
and greater ability to exercise their rights and responsibilities as owners of their 
companies.”299  If so many urged this position and recognize that it could help 
solve the problems, why did the SEC refuse to take the steps to make it happen?   
For many years, leading scholars have argued that giving shareholders more 
opportunities to participate in true corporate governance—nomination of 
directors—would provide a more informed investor that could lead to a more 
efficient market.300  In a survey done in 1985 of directors at large corporations, 
only seven percent stated that their contributions are critical to their respective 
companies’ success.301  In this same survey, forty-eight percent of the respondents 
said that they expected CEO pay to reach $1 million soon, “and also expected 
stockholders to raise a storm when it did.”302  Researchers conducted this survey 
on the heels of Smith v. Van Gorkom,303 a case where the Delaware Supreme Court 
showed signs of moving towards a system where directors would be more 
accountable for their actions.304  Because legislative action shortly after the 
decision weakened the effect, as we stand twenty-three years later, CEO pay has 
                                                          
296 See discussion supra Part III. 
297 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“the business and affairs of a 
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors . . . . The business judgment rule 
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299 PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 5. 
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303 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985) (“the Trial Court's conclusion that the 
Board reached an informed business judgment on . . . cannot be sustained”).  This case represented a 
very sharp wake-up call to the passive boards in Delaware.  A little later, though, and possibly to ensure 
that the state retained the business of the incorporated business, the Delaware legislature provided that a 
corporation may seek to avoid the result from Van Gorkom by including an exculpatory clause in their 
articles of incorporation.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007).  
304 Smith, 488 A.2d at 888.  
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skyrocketed past that estimate, yet the predicted outcry seems to have either never 
happened or been ignored.   
The market is ready for directors to step up and begin true arms-length 
bargaining with executives.  One way to ensure this occurs is to allow shareholders 
to “purge” boards that continually refuse to act in the shareholders’ best 
interests.305  With the threat of removal by shareholders a legitimate threat, boards 
would likely exercise more discretion in their dealings with executives.  The SEC 
did very well in opening the proxy process up to the Internet—a step that would 
undoubtedly aid shareholders in their ability to exercise power over the board.  As 
evidenced by the failure on the part of Congress, through the IRC, and the SEC, 
through increasing disclosure rules, reaching directors appears to be the only viable 
solution in controlling executive overcompensation.  The new chairwoman of the 
SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated that she favored pushing for the agency to implement 
increased proxy information to allow shareholders to affect board elections.306  
Specifically, she said, “Speaking for myself, I believe the SEC has not gone far 
enough in this . . . area, and so I intend to make proxy access - meaningful 
opportunities for a company’s owners to nominate its directors - a critical part of 
the Commission’s agenda in the coming months.”307 
D. Implications for the Future 
The proxy system is still a very expensive process, and the better solution 
would be for the SEC to reverse its recent interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and 
require companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials.308  
After examining the effectiveness of this approach through several proxy seasons, 
the SEC could begin working towards a system where shareholders will have 
access that is more direct.  Some of the catches with any new system, which the 
SEC would have to work through, will be working out incompatibilities with old 
rules and new rules.  These include rules regarding disclosure, ownership trigger 
disclosures, and anti-fraud provisions.309  None of which, however, represent an 
impediment too difficult to overcome through trial and error.  More significantly, 
some of the suggested changes could involve the SEC going into areas where 
Congress has not delegated it authority.310  If so, this issue could fall upon 
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Congress to pass legislation redefining the scope of the Securities Laws to enable 
the SEC to work in the best interests of the shareholders.  However, of note, the 
new chairwoman of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated that she favored pushing for 
the agency to implement increased proxy information to allow shareholders to 
affect board elections.311  Specifically, she said, “Speaking for myself, I believe the 
SEC has not gone far enough in this . . . area, and so I intend to make proxy access 
- meaningful opportunities for a company’s owners to nominate its directors - a 
critical part of the Commission’s agenda in the coming months.”312  It will be 
interesting to see if the SEC follows through with this approach.  
Only time will tell whether American shareholders will be willing to increase 
their activity and be willing to pressure boards of directors to do better jobs 
negotiating with executives regarding pay packages.  Unfortunately, if the 
shareholders were to decide that a change is necessary, the SEC and Congress have 
yet to provide the foundation for them to engage in appropriate corporate 
governance.  We can take the example provided by shareholders in the United 
Kingdom as evidence that, given the opportunity, the shareholders would become 
more engaged in the governance process.313  If both the SEC and Congress realize 
a problem exists, which seems to be the case given their recent activity in the area, 
one can only speculate as to when they will decide better steps must be taken for 
corrective action.  They can begin by giving shareholders the ability to exercise the 
power they already own by providing the capital to corporations that are the 
backbone of the American economy.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Executive overcompensation is a problem in the United States.  It has gone 
up at rapid paces while corporate profits and rank-and-file salaries have gone 
down.  The true solution to the problem lies with shareholders and their ability to 
exercise control and influence over directors who continually fail to work in the 
best interests of the company.  The attempts by Congress and the SEC have failed 
to provide the effective means for controlling excessive executive compensation 
because the IRC and SEC disclosure rules can easily be avoided through good 
lawyering and inventive techniques.  The SEC could redeem itself, reinterpret its 
latest ruling, return power to the shareholders, who will then be more likely to 
become active participants in corporate governance, and continue to work towards 
solutions to lowering executives’ pay.   
The large-block shareholders seem ready to nominate qualified directors who 
promise to engage in arms-length bargaining with management.  If these directors 
promise to control management, and the shareholders have substantial ability to 
affect the outcome of the voting at companies’ annual meetings, the larger 
shareholders would likely engage in the process.  In doing so, the directors would 
actually be serving those they are required to by law.  This would return the 
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compensation decision techniques to one truly driven by the market as opposed to 
the monopoly in bargaining power we have today.  Even the self-professed 
marketeers cannot deny that truth.   
The idea that the American economy and publicly held corporations work in 
a free market is only partly true.  Congress and SEC today exercise stringent 
oversight on companies, ensuring each meet listing requirements and other 
safeguards, largely because of the events leading to the Great Depression.  They 
should now allow shareholders to take advantage of the new mediums available to 
reverse the long-held corporate governance ideology in the United States.  If the 
status quo continues, then our problem will persist.  I hope that we can target 
solutions, as the Apollo 13 crew did, before it is too late, because the consequences 
of inaction could be severe. 
